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 Abstract  Article 25 of the Belgian Constitution of 1831 speciﬁ es that all powers 
emanate from the nation, but fails to deﬁ ne who or what the nation is. This chapter 
aims at reconstructing the underdetermined meaning of national sovereignty by 
looking into a wide array of sources concerning the genesis and reception of the 
Belgian Constitution. It argues, ﬁ rstly, that ‘nation’ and ‘King’ were conceptually 
differentiated notions, revealing a concern on the part of the Belgian National 
Congress to substitute the popular principle for the monarchical one. By vesting the 
origin of sovereignty exclusively in the nation, it relegated the monarch to the posi-
tion of a constituted power. Secondly, it refutes the widely accepted deﬁ nition of 
national sovereignty as the counterpart of popular sovereignty. The debates of the 
constituent assembly prove that the antithesis between the concepts ‘nation’ and 
‘people’, supposedly originating in two rivalling political-theoretical traditions, is a 
false one. Not only were both terms used as synonyms, the Congress delegates 
themselves plainly proclaimed the sovereignty of the people. However, this did not 
imply the establishment of universal suffrage, since political participation was lim-
ited to the propertied classes. The revolutionary press generally endorsed the popu-
lar principle, too, without necessarily agreeing to the form it was given in practice. 
The legitimacy of the National Congress’s claim to speak in the name of the people 
was challenged both by the conservative press, which rejected the sovereignty of the 
people, and by the radical newspapers, which considered popular sovereignty inval-
idated by the instatement of census suffrage. 
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1  Introduction 
 On 27 October 1830 the Constitutional  Commission , instated by the Belgian 
Provisional  Government , ﬁ nished its activities. 1 The creation of the Commission 
had been announced on 6 October, 2 days after the Provisional  Government ofﬁ -
cially proclaimed Belgian  independence . 2 The Commission’s main task was to draw 
up a  draft Constitution for the new country, which would then be discussed by the 
National  Congress , Belgium’s constituent  assembly . 3 The publication of the  draft 
Constitution immediately sparked up public discussions about the basic features of 
the new state. 4 F.  Grenier , an otherwise unknown author, was only one of many 
Belgian citizens who took to the press to express his views on the  draft Constitution. 
In his  Examen du projet de constitution de la Belgique et idées sur une nouvelle 
forme de gouvernement (“Examination of the  draft Constitution for Belgium and 
ideas for a new form of government”),  Grenier staged a passionate defence for the 
 sovereignty of the  nation :
 Je conçois la possibilité de rendre permanente, dans notre patrie, l’action de la souveraineté 
nationale, de manière à ne plus revoir les effroyables désordres des bouleversemens poli-
tiques. Nous savons maintenant que toute monarchie tempérée est un conﬂ it presque con-
tinuel des deux éléments de puissance souveraine. L’institution du Congrès et le simple 
raisonnement font comprendre que la souveraineté est déplacée quand elle est ailleurs que 
dans la nation, et que toute division quelconque dans la souveraineté est la source des com-
motions sociales, toujours si dangereuses. 5 
 The battle cry of the Belgian  revolution aries was ‘liberty for everyone in 
everything’. 6 According to  Grenier , this implied the victory of the  democratic prin-
ciple over the  monarchical one. The  nation no longer wished to share  sovereignty 
with a monarchial power, he contended, because the perpetual combat between the 
two elements undermined the order of the state. Therefore, only the delegates of the 
sovereign  nation , united in the Chamber of  Representatives , were to make laws 
under the new Constitution.  Grenier criticised the  draft Constitution for being 
1  Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie (oktober–november 1830): tekst van haar 
notulen en ontstaan van de Belgische grondwet , 40. 
2  Bulletin des arrêtés et actes du Gouvernement Provisoire de la Belgique no. 5, p. 13, 10/10/1830. 
3  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 4, p. 43–49. 
4  Magits ,  De Volksraad en de opstelling van de Belgische grondwet, 352;  Nothomb ,  Essai histo-
rique et politique sur la révolution belge , 98. 
5  “I can imagine a possibility to render the operation of national  sovereignty in our fatherland per-
manent, in such a way as to avoid the terrible disorders of political upheaval. We now know that 
every tempered monarchy is an almost continuous conﬂ ict between the two elements of supreme 
power. The institution of the Congress as well as simple reasoning learn that sovereignty is out of 
place when it is anywhere else than in the nation, and that every division of sovereignty is the 
source of dangerous social commotion”.  Grenier ,  Examen du projet de constitution de la Belgique 
et idées sur une nouvelle forme de gouvernement. 
6  Hymans,  Le Congrès national de 1830 et la Constitution de 1831 ;  Nothomb ,  Essai . Demoulin 
attributes this motto to De  Lamennais . Demoulin, Le courant libéral à l’époque de royaume des 
Pays-Bas et dans la Révolution de 1830, 32. 
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ambiguous on this point, and for including a  Senate which, being composed of 
hereditary members, would infringe on the free exercise of power by the  sovereign 
 nation . He especially warned against the vague deﬁ nition of ‘ nation’ in the  draft 
Constitution, which allowed for diverging  readings :
 L’art. 4 du projet déclare que tous les pouvoirs (ceux politiques sans doute), émanent de la 
nation. Prenant pour accordé que les pouvoirs ne sont rien que par elle; c’est à elle qu’il 
appartient de les instituer. La souveraineté nationale doit rester au-dessus de tout pouvoir 
ordinaire; mais il faut que la constitution déﬁ nisse ce que c’est que la nation. Il importe de 
savoir quels sont les individus qui forment la nation. Les termes qui n’ont pas de valeur 
convenue obscurcissent les idées, enfantent les aberrations. L’art. 8o dit que les députés 
représentent la nation, ce qui autorise de croire que le sénat ne la représente pas. L’art. 79 
dit que les députés sont élus directement par les citoyens; le projet ne dit pas ce que c’est 
qu’un citoyen. 7 
 As it turned out,  Grenier cried in the wilderness.  Article 4 of the  draft Constitution 
was literally copied in the ﬁ nal Belgian  Constitution of 1831. Up to this day,  article 
25 of the Constitution reads: “Tous les pouvoirs émanent de la nation. Ils sont 
exercés de la manière établie par la Constitution” (“All the powers emanate from the 
nation. They are exercised in the manner established by the Constitution”).  Grenier 
was right about the ambiguousness of the formulation. It is therefore all the more 
striking that the National  Congress adopted the  article virtually unanimously and 
without  debate , on 3 January 1831. One single dissenting voice was heard, as the 
priest Vander  Linden pleaded the cause of divine  sovereignty as the only  legitimate 
source of law. 8 He received no support from the benches, not even from the side of 
the ultramontane  Catholic delegates. The formulation of  article 25 apparently suited 
the needs of all parties in the great compromise that was being forged between 
 Catholic and  liberal elites over the new Constitution. 
 As the Constitution was not preceded by a  preamble specifying its great underly-
ing principles, the concept of national  sovereignty remained as vague as  Grenier had 
feared. The underdetermined meaning of national  sovereignty in the Belgian 
 Constitution of 1831 is the subject of this contribution. The meaning(s) of the term 
will be reconstructed by looking into a variety of sources that shed light on the con-
text of the constitutional  formation  process as well as on its reception. Central to 
this investigation are the  debates of the National Congress, which allow to gauge the 
ideas and intentions of the members of the Belgian constituent  assembly . On the 
reception side, evidence is provided by pamphlet literature,  newspapers and consti-
tutional  manuals . The ﬁ rst section of this chapter goes into the meaning of national 
 sovereignty from the point of view of the balance of  power between  King and 
7  “Article 4 of the  draft declares that all the powers (the political ones, that probably is) emanate 
from the nation. Taking for granted that the powers are nothing without her, it is she who is entitled 
to instate them. National  sovereignty must remain superior to ordinary power; but the Constitution 
must deﬁ ne what the nation is. It is important to know which individuals make up the nation. 
Terms without a ﬁ xed meaning obscure the ideas and produce aberrations. Article 80 states that the 
delegates represent the nation, suggesting that the Senate does not. Article 79 states that the dele-
gates are directly elected by the citizens; the  draft does not specify what a citizen is”. 
8  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 2, p. 14, 03/01/1831. See also:  Magits ,  De Volksraad, 8. 
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 Parliament . In the second section, the implications of  article 25 for the distinction 
between national and popular  sovereignty will be examined. Finally, the ﬁ ndings of 
the ﬁ rst two sections will be tested against the evidence provided by the debates in 
contemporary society as reﬂ ected by the  press . The focus will be on the understand-
ing of national  sovereignty at the time of the Constitution’s  genesis , i.e. on the 
intended meaning of the term. Its application in practice by successive generations 
of Belgian politicians falls outside of this chapter’s scope. 
2  Parliament Versus  King 
2.1  Parliament as the Sole Representative of the  Nation 
 Like most of the articles of the Belgian  Constitution ,  article 25 was not newly 
invented. 9 Article 3 of the  Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du  Citoyen of 
1789, which served as  preamble to the French  Constitution of 1791 , reads: “Le 
principe de toute souveraineté réside essentiellement dans la nation”. 10 Similar for-
mulations ﬁ gure in the Cádiz  Constitution of 1812, the Portuguese  Constitution of 
1822 and the declaration of the First Chamber of the French Parliament of 1830. 11 
In their haste to confection of a  draft Constitution for the new country, the members 
of the Constitutional  Commission did not care for originality. 12 The Commission’s 
president, Etienne de  Gerlache , commented:
 On a choisi dans les constitutions existantes, et particulièrement dans la charte française 
 actuelle , les dispositions qui ont paru s’approprier le mieux à notre pays; et on y en a ajouté 
beaucoup d’autres qui sont désirées par les meilleurs publicistes européens. (…) Il ne ren-
ferme rien ou presque rien de nouveau; et c’est ce qui en fait, selon moi, le mérite. Il ne faut 
rien donner à l’aventure quand il s’agit des institutions d’un pays. Et personne de nous n’a 
été assez osé pour improviser des nouveautés. 13 
 Indeed, 90 % of the  articles  of the Belgian  Constitution of 1831 , which closely 
followed the  Commission’s  draft , were  textually copied from older examples. 14 The 
articles of the  draft Constitution mainly derived from the French  Constitution of 
9  Descamps,  La mosaïque constitutionnelle. Essai sur les sources du texte de la Constitution belge. 
10  “The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the people”. 
11  Harris, European Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century, 506. 
12  Descamps,  La mosaïque constitutionnelle , 51; Van den  Steene ,  De grondwetscommissie , 60. 
13  “From the existing constitutions, and particularly from the present French  Charte , we have 
selected those dispositions that seemed best suited to our country; and we have added many others 
that are desired by the best publicists in Europe. (…) It contains nothing or almost nothing new; 
and that I consider its merit. When the institutions of a country are concerned, adventures are out 
of place. And none of us have been daring enough to improvise novelties”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions , 
vol. 1, p. 324, 25/11/1830. For De Gerlache, see: Demoulin, Gerlache (Etienne-Constantin, baron 
de)  ; Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie , 14–16 . 
14  Gilissen , Die belgische Verfassung von 1831. Ihr Ursprung und ihr Einﬂ uss, 60. 
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1791 , the  Charte of  1814 / 1830 and the Dutch  Fundamental Law of  1815 . All except 
one of the  Commission members were  jurists , who had either been trained at French 
institutions or at the universities of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which heavily 
relied on the French legal tradition. 15 Nonetheless, in its totality, the Belgian 
 Constitution of 1831 offered something new, as contemporaries were quick to 
realise. 16 
 As David Harris remarks, the dropping of the qualiﬁ cation ‘essentially’ is signiﬁ -
cant in this respect. 17 The sovereignty of  nation acquired a more radical quality, 
which has often been described as a turn towards a deﬁ nite break with the monarchi-
cal  principle . 18  Article  32 of the Constitution, specifying the modalities of the exer-
cise of the  sovereign power, points in the same direction: “Les membres des deux 
Chambres représentent la Nation, et non uniquement la province ou la subdivision 
de province qui les a nommés”. 19 Equally derived from the French  Constitution of 
1791 (and later copied in its successors of the year  III and  1848 ), this provision had 
originally been conceived as a turn away from the imperative  mandate of the Old 
 Regime Estates  General , which was deemed incompatible with the unitary concept 
of nation consecrated by the French  Revolution . 20 Its inclusion in the Belgian 
 Constitution was partly inspired by a desire to stave off a repetition of the fate of the 
 United Belgian Provinces . 21 This short-lived Belgian republic, born from the 
 Brabant Revolt against the rule of the Austrian Emperor Joseph  II in 1789-’90, had 
partly failed due to its excessively  regionalist inner structure. 22 
 More important to our present goal, the ﬁ rst section of the  article unambiguously 
designated the members of  Parliament as the exclusive representatives of the sover-
eign  nation . In another move away from tradition, the  Congress discarded both 
15  Idem, 59; Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie . 
16  De  Smaele , Eclectisch en toch nieuw. De uitvinding van het Belgisch parlement; Descamps,  La 
mosaïque , 90; Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie , 62. 
17  Harris, European Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century , 506. 
18  L’article 25 de la constitution proclame que la souveraineté réside dans la nation elle-même. La 
nation ne délègue que l’exercice des pouvoirs: de là résulte qu’elle peut révoquer tout mandat 
donné et que les mandataires ne peuvent gouverner que d’après sa  volonté . Une semblable disposi-
tion n’est que la négation théorique du principe des théocraties, des monarchies et des  aristocrat-
ies ”. Tempels, Droit constitutionnel, 440. Other authors consider it rather as an expression of the 
compromise, in the sense of their cohabitation, between royal sovereignty of Old  Regime origin 
and popular  sovereignty born from the  Revolution : Müβig, L’ouverture du mouvement constitu-
tionnel après 1830: à la recherche d’un équilibre entre la souveraineté monarchique et la souver-
aineté populaire. Pierre Wigny rejects this thesis on the ground of the Nation’s initial consent to the 
monarch’s  mandate , which can at any time be retracted:  Wigny ,  Droit constitutionnel. Principe et 
droit positif , 222. 
19  “The members of the two chambers represent the  Nation , and not only the province or the sub-
division of a province which has elected them”. 
20  Lefebvre ,  The Belgian Constitution of 1831: the Citizen Burgher , 90; Roels,  Le concept de 
représentation politique au dix-huitième siècle français , 122. 
21 Alen,  Treatise on Belgian Constitutional Law , 12. 
22  Defoort, Particularisme en eenheidsstreven. De Verenigde Nederlandse Staten. For the Brabant 
Revolt, see: Polasky,  Revolution in Brussels. 
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heredity and monarchical  prerogative for the appointment of the  senators . 23 The 
members of both chambers were designated via direct  election and by the same 
electorate (art. 47, 53). In this light it cannot be maintained that the conception of 
 sovereignty in the Belgian  Constitution bore the marks of the monarchical  principle . 
A constitutional  manual published immediately after the proclamation of the 
Constitution indeed attributed  article 32 to ‘the triumph of popular  sovereignty’ . 24 
 The structure of the constitutional  document mirrors this  interpretation . The 
powers were discussed in the third title, after the territory and the personal liberties. 
Within this title, the  chambers were discussed ﬁ rst, then the  King and his ministers 
and then the  judiciary . 25 This order of precedence is especially revealing when com-
pared to the Dutch Fundamental  Law of 1815, the ﬁ rst chapter of which was entitled 
“On the sovereign monarch” . A lengthy catalogue of royal  prerogatives preceded 
the chapter on the Estates  General , thus exemplifying the underlying monarchical 
 principle . 26 A comparison of the  preambles  of both documents is just as revealing. 
The absence of a proper  preamble  in the Belgian  Constitution is remarkable in 
itself. Nonetheless, the preceding formula in the act of proclamation, which came 
closest to a  preamble , was programmatic: “Au nom du people belge, le Congrès 
national décrète” (“In the name of the Belgian people, the National  Congress 
decrees”). It could not contrast more with the opening lines of the  preamble of the 
Fundamental  Law : “We,  William , by the grace of  God ”. Despite not technically 
being a  charte  octroyée , the Fundamental  Law was a typical product of  Restoration 
constitutionalism. 27 The Belgian  Constitution of 1831 may rightly be read as a 
counter-reaction against the political order under William  I enshrined by it, or, in 
Niek van Sas’ words, as its “programmatical indictment”. 28 
 As a result of the frustration of the Belgian opposition with William  I’s  autocratic 
style of government, the new Constitution expressed the distrust of royal power 
23  De  Smaele , Eclectisch en toch nieuw; Stevens, Een belangrijke faze in de wordingsgeschiedenis 
van de Belgische grondwet: de optie voor een tweekamerstelsel. 
24  N.N.,  Manuel constitutionnel de la Belgique contenant le portrait, la vie et la nomination de M. 
le régent, la Constitution et la loi électorale de la Belgique, expliquées et conférées avec l’ancienne 
loi fondamentale , p. 46: “La crainte du despotisme et l’esprit de parti, le triomphe de la souver-
aineté du peuple, a porté la majorité du Congrès national à cette disposition. En France ( Charte , art. 
23), la nomination des sénateurs ou des pairs appartient au Roi; leur nombre est illimité; il peut en 
varier les dignités, les nommes à vie ou les rendre héréditaires, selon sa volonté. Les Belges usent 
d’une initiative qui peut devenir dangereuse”. 
25  Koll, Belgien, 495. The structure of the Belgian Constitution closely followed the French 
 Constitution of 1791 : Descamps,  La mosaïque . 
26  De  Gerlache ,  Histoire du Royaume des Pays-Bas depuis 1814 jusqu’en 1830 , 316; Koch, Le Roi 
décide seul/de Koning alleen besluit. Het ‘systeem Willem I’;  Marteel ,  Inventing the Belgian 
Revolution. Politics and Political Thought in the United Kingdom of the Netherlands (1814-1830) , 
31. 
27  Mirkine- Guetzévitch , L’histoire constitutionnelle comparée, 93. 




which prevailed both in the  Congress and in public opinion. 29 The keystone of the 
system of national  sovereignty instated in 1831 was  article 78: “Le Roi n’a d’autres 
pouvoirs que ceux que lui attribuent formellement la Constitution et les lois particu-
lières portées en vertu de la Constitution même”. 30 Here too, the sovereignty 
arrangement of the Fundamental  Law was reversed so as to become its exact oppo-
site. Under the Fundamental  Law , the Estates  General had only possessed attributed 
powers, whereas all residual powers fell to the  King . The Belgian  Constitution of 
1831 created the opposite constellation. 31 A very precise list of royal  prerogatives 
was followed by the formal limitation of royal power by  article 78. 32 This highly 
original prescription marked the end of the monarchical principle. 33 All residual 
powers were henceforward legally assumed by the representatives of the  nation 
united in  Parliament . 
 The  articles 25, 32 and 78 combined in an arrangement where sovereignty no 
longer worked top down but bottom up. The origin of  sovereign power was exclu-
sively popular.  Parliament moreover disposed of effective means to control and, if 
necessary, to blow the whistle over the executive, by the yearly vote over the  budget 
(art. 115). 34 Although  sovereignty emanated from the  nation , it was constitutionally 
made sure that the latter did not exercise it in its entirety. Parliamentary despotism 
was precluded by a clear  separation of powers . Or rather, in André  Alen ’s words, a 
division of powers. 35 The English system of checks and  balances , as it had been 
interpreted by  Montesquieu and, above all, by Benjamin  Constant , was the great 
example followed by the members of the Belgian constituent  assembly . 36 The three 
powers were thus organised to inﬂ uence and counterbalance each other. Therefore, 
the legislative  power was shared between both chambers and the  King , who also 
headed the executive. 37 
29  Senelle, Le monarque constitutionnel en Belgique; Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscom-
missie , 53. 
30  “The  King has no other powers than those formally attributed to him by the Constitutions and by 
the ordinary laws established under the Constitution”. 
31  Lefebvre ,  The Belgian Constitution , 25. Errera stresses the omnipotence of  Parliament within the 
boundaries of the Constitution, providing it with a dominant position vis-à-vis the other powers: 
“il [le parlement] est virtuellement omnipotent dans les limites constitutionnelles; il occupe une 
place prépondérante à l’égard des autres pouvoirs de l’Etat. Ainsi en est-il en Belgique. Seule la 
Constitution restreint sa compétence, par l’établissement des autres pouvoirs et par la garantie des 
libertés individuelles”.  Errera ,  Traité du droit public belge , 121. 
32  Errera ,  Traité du droit public belge , 19. 
33 Alen ,  Treatise on Belgian Constitutional Law , 4. 
34  Senelle, Le monarque constitutionnel en Belgique, 55. 
35 Alen ,  Treatise on Belgian Constitutional Law , 9. 
36  De  Smaele , Eclectisch en toch nieuw, 410;  Lefebvre ,  The Belgian Constitution of 1831 ;  Marteel , 
 Polemieken over natievorming in het Verenigd Koninkrijk der Nederlanden. Een blik op de intel-
lectuele wortels van het Belgisch nationalisme , 2012; Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grond-
wetscommissie , 63. 
37  Vile,  Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers , 72. 
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2.2  Congress as the Sole Constituting  Power 
 Given the  genesis  of the Belgian  Constitution of 1831, anything less than a popular 
origin of  sovereignty would have come as a surprise. Contrary to the Fundamental 
 Law of 1815 and the French Charters of  1814 and  1830 , the Belgian  Constitution 
was not the result of a negotiation between a national representation and a monarch. 
At the time of the National  Congress , royal authority had come to an end due to the 
Belgian  Revolution . The executive  power was exercised by a collective Provisional 
 Government , whereas the legislative and  constituent powers were entirely in the 
hands of the National  Congress . The Congress acted as the sole representative of the 
Belgian people. It was thus the only and omnipotent  pouvoir constituant . The for-
mula ‘omnipotence of Congress’ was literally used in the  debates . 38 
 The Congress members were designated through direct  elections on 3 November 
1830. 39 The electorate consisted of about 30,000 male citizens, 40 representing 
around 0.7 % of the population. 41 Census franchise was combined with capacity 
franchise, giving the vote to all holders of university degrees (as well as certain 
intellectual professions) and clerics. 42 Capacity  suffrage and direct elections (as 
opposed to the complicated indirect system under the Kingdom of the Netherlands) 
were innovations introduced so as to fulﬁ l the Provisional  Government ’s intention 
to create “the most popular  election method possible”. 43 Jean-Baptiste  Nothomb , 
secretary to the Constitutional  Commission (which was also responsible for the 
electoral regulations) commented: “Jamais assemblée nationale n’a dérivé plus 
directement de la masse de la nation”. 44 
 The  Congress members were fully aware of their quality of representatives of the 
people, in whose name they spoke and acted. President Jean-François  Gendebien 
38  Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 2, p. 502, 11/02/1831. 
39  Bulletin des arrêtés et actes du Gouvernement Provisoire de la Belgique no. 12, p. 14, 25/10/1830. 
40  Of the 46,099 citizens who had the right to vote, 28,766 participated in the  elections for the 
Congress:  Magits ,  De Volksraad, 408. 
41  Gilissen,  Le régime représentatif en Belgique depuis 1790 , 84;  Magits ,  De Volksraad , 408. 
42  Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie , 30;  Magits ,  De Volksraad , 33. 
43 As declared in its proclamation of 6 October 1830: “Elle [la Commission] s’occupera, avant tout 
autre chose, du nouveau mode d’élection qui sera le plus populaire possible”.  Bulletin des arrêtés 
et actes du Gouvernement Provisoire de la Belgique no. 5, p. 13, 10/10/1830. See also: Van den 
 Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie, 32. In its proclamation of 10 October, the Provisional 
 Government had announced: “Considérant que le congrès appelé à décider des intérêts de la 
Belgique doit être une véritable représentation nationale, qu’il est donc nécessaire d’adopter, dès à 
présent, un système d’élection directe et libérale” (“Considering that the Congress, called upon to 
decide on the interest of Belgium, must be a true national representation, and that it is thus neces-
sary to adopt, from the present moment on, a direct and liberal electoral system”).  Bulletin des 
arrêtés et actes du Gouvernement Provisoire de la Belgique no. 7, p. 5, 16/10/1830. 
44  “Never has a national  assembly been derived more directly from the mass of the nation”. National 
Archives of Belgium, Papiers  Nothomb , ‘Note sur la Constitution belge’. See also: Van den Steene, 
 De Belgische grondwetscommissie , 32. For Nothomb, see: De Borchgrave, Nothomb (Jean-
Baptiste, baron) and Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie , 25–26. 
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opened the ﬁ rst session of the Congress in the Palace of the Nation in Brussels on 
10 November 1830 with the words: “Le congrès national s’installe au nom du peu-
ple belge”. 45 Its decrees, as well as the  Constitution , were likewise issued in the 
name of the Belgian people. The  newspaper  Le Courrier wrote:
 (…) la décision du congrès constituera pour tous une loi souveraine, un arrêt sans appel. 
C’est au congrès que la nation a délégué l’exercice de ses pleins pouvoirs; tout ce qui émane 
du congrès est censé émaner de la nation elle-même. Sa décision sera donc obligatoire pour 
tous et la moindre tentative de violation dirigée contre elle, serait un crime de rébellion 
contre la loi. 46 
 The  Congress jealously guarded its position as the only  legitimate authority on 
the grounds of its direct  election by the people. It didn’t tolerate any other source of 
power, as its distrustful attitude towards the Provisional  Government proves. 47 The 
issue immediately came to the fore when, at the start of the opening session, dele-
gate De Gerlache proposed to ofﬁ cially inform the Provisional Government of the 
Congress’s reunion and to invite it to attend. De  Mûelenaere objected that delegat-
ing a group of  Congress members to convey this message would degrade the 
Congress, since, on the grounds of its  election by the people, it didn’t recognise any 
authority higher than its own:
 Je crois qu’un tel mode serait contraire à la dignité du congrès nommé directement par le 
peuple belge qu’il représente. Le congrès se constitue de son propre mouvement et ne paraît 
pas devoir être installé par aucune autre autorité, puisqu’il ne reconnaît aucun  pouvoir con-
stitué supérieur au sien. En conséquence, je suis d’avis que le gouvernement provisoire soit 
averti par un de messieurs les membres du bureau ou par un des huissiers. 48 
 The Provisional  Government had been created in the midst of  revolutionary con-
fusion to assure public order after the collapse of the Dutch government. It had 
grown out of the  Commission administrative that had been established in Brussels 
on 24 September 1830 to replace the existing urban administration. 49 In a quick 
45  “The Congress installs itself in the name of the Belgian people”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 1, 
p. 99, 10/11/1830. 
46  “(…) the Congress’s decision will constitute for us a sovereign law, a decree without appeal. The 
nation has delegated the exercise of its full powers to the Congress. All that emanates from the 
Congress must be considered to emanate from the nation itself. Its decision will therefore be oblig-
atory for everyone. The slightest attempt of violation against it, will be a crime of rebellion against 
the law”.  Le Courrier no. 35, 04/02/1831. For  Le Courrier and its predecessor, the  Courrier des 
Pays-Bas , see footnote 211. 
47  Gilissen , Le caractère collégial des premières formes de gouvernement et d’administration de 
l’Etat Belge (1830-1831), 621. 
48  “I believe that to act in such a way would run counter to the dignity of the Congress, directly 
elected by the Belgian people which it represents. The Congress constitutes itself and it does so of 
its own accord. It mustn’t seem to have to be installed by any other authority, because it doesn’t 
recognise any other  constituted  power superior to its own. Consequently, I think that the Provisional 
 Government must be informed by one of the gentlemen of the bureau or by one of the ushers”. 
 Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 1, p. 100, 10/11/1830. 
49  Gilissen , Le caractère collégial, 611;  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 4, p. 2; Witte,  De constructie 
van België, 1828–1847 , 63. 
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 succession of events, it succeeded in extending its authority over the whole Belgian 
territory. 50 Within this body, power was in the hand of the ﬁ ve-strong  Comité 
Central . 51 It was this organ which, by its proclamation of the 4th of October, declared 
Belgian  independence from the Kingdom of the Netherlands and convened the 
National  Congress . 52 Although it spoke and acted in the name of the Belgian people, 
the powers of the Provisional  Government did not rest on a democratic  mandate . It 
exercised both  legislative and executive  power , while at the same time intervening 
in the  judiciary sphere by appointing and dismissing magistrates. 53 In one of its ﬁ rst 
resolutions, it decreed the expiration of its  mandate as soon as “worthier hands” 
would be ready to take over. 54 The underlying  justiﬁ cation was that, in the power 
vacuum between the ending of Dutch authority and the  election of the people’s 
representatives, the circumstances had forced it to exercise  sovereignty in the name 
of the Belgian people. 55 
 The  Congress followed this reasoning. Despite De  Mûelenaere ’s objections, the 
members of the  government were invited into the meeting hall and met with enthu-
siastic applause. The eldest member, the journalist and revolutionary hero Louis de 
 Potter , delivered a speech in which he  justiﬁ ed the coming to power of the Provisional 
 Government by its endeavours to protect the Belgian  Revolution as well as by the 
consent of the people. 56 Bringing to mind the revolt against the Dutch government, 
he said:
 Le fruit de cette victoire était  l’indépendance . Le peuple l’a déclarée par notre organe. 
Interprète de ses vœux, le gouvernement provisoire vous a appelés, messieurs, vous, les 
hommes choisis par la nation belge, pour constituer cette indépendance et pour la consol-
ider à jamais. Mais, en attendant que vous puissiez venir remplir cette tâche, un centre 
d’action était nécessaire pour pourvoir aux premiers, aux plus urgents besoins de l’Etat. Un 
gouvernement provisoire s’est établi, et il a suppléé temporairement à l’absence de tout 
pouvoir. La nécessité d’un gouvernement quelconque justiﬁ ait sa mission; l’assentiment du 
peuple conﬁ rma son mandat. 57 
50  Gilissen ,  Le régime représentatif, 80. 
51  Bulletin des arrêtés et actes du Gouvernement Provisoire de la Belgique no. 1, p. 6, 01/10/1830. 
52  Bulletin des arrêtés et actes du Gouvernement Provisoire de la Belgique no. 4, p. 3, 08/10/1830. 
53  Gilissen ,  Le régime représentatif , 79;  Witte ,  De constructie, 64. 
54  Bulletin des arrêtés et actes du Gouvernement Provisoire de la Belgique no. 1, p. 3, 01/10/1830. 
55  “Il tenait son mandat de la nécessité. Lorsqu’un ordre de choses périt, il y a, entre le passé qui 
n’est plus et l’avenir qui n’est pas encore, un interrègne où le pouvoir appartient momentanément 
à qui le prend; si la lacune n’était pas remplie, la société elle-même serait et resterait dissoute; il 
faut bien que quelqu’un vienne prononcer le  fi at tout-puissant qui doit la maintenir et la réorgan-
iser. C’est là une légitimité incontestable”. Nothomb,  Essai historique , 75. 
56  For De  Potter , see: De Potter et. al.,  Louis de Potter, révolutionnaire belge en 1830 ; Juste,  Louis 
de Potter: membre du gouvernement provisoire. D’après des documents inédits . 
57  “The fruit of this victory was  independence . The people has declared it via us. Interpreter of its 
wishes, the Provisional  Government has called upon you, the men chosen by the Belgian Nation, 
to constitute this  independence and to consolidate it forever. But, in anticipation of your being able 
to come and fulﬁ l this task, a centre of action was needed to foresee in the ﬁ rst, the most urgent 
needs of state. A Provisional Government has been created to temporarily make up for the absence 
of all power. The need for any kind of government justiﬁ ed its mission; the approval of the people 
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 Acting as “the interpreter of the people’s  wishes ”, the Provisional  Government 
had met the most urgent needs of the State until the moment the people’s representa-
tives convened in  Congress . De  Potter didn’t proceed to ofﬁ cially lay down the 
powers of the Provisional  Government however, causing alarm among some of the 
delegates. 58 In the third session, De  Foere intervened to demand urgent clariﬁ cation 
with regard to the  mission of the Provisional Government. Although he agreed that 
the Government had  legitimately held provisional power in the interest of the  nation , 
he insisted that its mission had ended at the ﬁ rst meeting of the  Congress :
 (…) les gouvernements se constituent de deux manières: d’abord, dans des temps ordi-
naires, par l’assentiment librement exprimé des nations; ensuite, dans des temps extraordi-
naires, par leur assentiment tacite. J’appelle des temps extraordinaires ces transitions 
violentes par lesquelles les États passent d’une forme d’existence à une autre, et pendant 
lesquelles les nations ont recours à l’impérieuse loi de la nécessité pour établir l’ordre et la 
sécurité, pour garantir les États contre les horreurs de l’anarchie. Tous les publicistes 
admettent cette loi de la nécessité comme principe provisoirement constitutif des États 
anarchiques. Les  jurisconsultes la rangent parmi les causes des exemptions légales, et les 
moralistes l’adoptent comme raison sufﬁ sante de se croire dispensé de l’observance des 
devoirs qui nous sont imposés par des lois humaines. Mais cette loi de la nécessité, de 
l’aveu de tous, a ses règles et ses bornes. II est généralement admis que cette loi, recevant 
son existence de la nécessité, rentre dans le néant par la cessation de cette nécessité même. 
Il est incontestable que notre gouvernement provisoire se soit établi sur cette loi de la néces-
sité, incontestable encore qu’il ait reçu son mandat de l’assentiment tacite de la nation 
belge; mais aussi il me semble qu’il n’est pas moins évident que cette loi a cessé par la 
cessation de sa cause, et que, depuis la vériﬁ cation des pouvoirs des membres du congrès 
national, l’assentiment tacite, par lequel la nation belge avait conféré l’administration de ses 
intérêts communs au gouvernement provisoire, reste désormais sans application. Il résulte 
de ces principes, messieurs, que le pouvoir du gouvernement provisoire est expiré. 59 
conﬁ rms its mandate”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 1, p. 101, 10/11/1830. Thonissen in his authori-
tative constitutional  manual approved of this  legitimation by “the force of circumstances and the 
approval of the nation”.  Thonissen ,  La Constitution belge annotée, offrant sous chaque article 
l’état de la doctrine de la jurisprudence et de la législation, 335. 
58  The delay effectively reﬂ ected the Provisional  Government ’s reluctance to release power. 
Especially De  Potter feared that this move would thwart his plans for the foundation of a Belgian 
 Republic , with himself as its ﬁ rst president. De Mulder,  De republikeinse beweging, 14. 
59  “(…) governments are generally constituted in two ways. Firstly, in ordinary times, by the freely 
expressed approval of nations. Secondly, in extraordinary times, by their tacit approval. I call 
extraordinary times those violent transitions when states pass from one form of existence to 
another, and during which nations take recourse to the imperious law of necessity for establishing 
order and security, for safeguarding states against the horrors of anarchy. All the publicists admit 
this law of necessity as the provisionally constitutive principle of anarchic states. The jurists cat-
egorise it under the causes of legal exemptions, and the moralists accept it as a sufﬁ cient reason to 
consider one exempted from the obligations imposed by human laws. But this law of necessity has 
its rules and its limits, as all will agree. It is generally accepted that this law, originating from 
necessity, is nulliﬁ ed as soon as this necessity ceases to exist. It is an uncontested truth that our 
Provisional  Government has been established under this law of necessity. It is equally true that it 
has received its  mandate  from the tacit approval of the Belgian Nation. But I consider it no less 
evident that this law has ceased to exist by the disappearance of its cause and that, since the 
moment of the veriﬁ cation of the powers of the members of the National Congress, the tacit 
approval by which the Belgian Nation had conferred the administration of its common interest to 
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 The extraordinary circumstances which had  legitimised the Provisional 
 Government ’s mission having ceased, its very right of existence had ended. The 
anxieties of De  Foere and others were soon quelled, when during the very same ses-
sion the Provisional  Government delegated Jean-Baptiste  Nothomb to lay down its 
powers in the hands of the  Congress . 60 The Congress responded by rendering thanks 
to the Provisional  Government for its services and by charging it with the continued 
exercise of the executive  power until the deﬁ nite settlement of the state 
organisation. 
 However, the question of  legitimacy continued to produce bouts of distrust 
towards the Provisional  Government on the part of the National Congress. Tellingly, 
it refused to accept the  draft Constitution drawn up by the Constitutional 
 Commission . 61 Since the Commission had been convened by the Provisional 
 Government  before the  election of the Congress, the  draft could not be said to ema-
nate from the  will  of the  nation . Joseph  Forgeur , himself the author of another con-
stitutional proposal, protested:
 Le projet de constitution doit émaner du congrès lui-même: non que je veuille diminuer le 
mérite du projet imprimé qui est le fruit de consciencieuses études, mais il n’est pas conven-
able que le congrès donne la priorité à un projet quelconque rédigé hors de son sein. 62 
 Joseph  Lebeau , member of the Constitutional  Commission , protested that the 
 draft had received the approval of the  nation by the  election of its authors to the 
 Congress . The Commission’s president De  Gerlache ﬁ nally submitted the proposal 
in his own name, so as to strip it from its connection to the Provisional  Government 
and make it “emanate from the Congress itself”. 63 
 After being accepted, the Commission’s  draft was in effect used as the guiding 
document for the  debate s of the  constituent  assembly. Preliminary discussions over 
each individual  article took place in ten committees or ‘sections’ composed of 20 
delegates each, who reported to a Central  Section . 64 The reports drawn up by the 
latter served as the starting point for the subsequent plenary  debates in Congress. 65 
In the end, 80 % of the  articles  of the Commission’s  draft were included in the ﬁ nal 
the Provisional Government, is now void. As a result of these principles, gentlemen, the powers of 
the Provisional Government have expired”. Huyttens,  Discussions , vol. 1, p. 117, 12/11/1830. 
60  Bulletin des arrêtés et actes du Gouvernement Provisoire de la Belgique no. 31, p. 7, 18/11/1830. 
61  Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 1, p. 325, 25/11/1830;  Gilissen , Le caractère collégial, 621; Van den 
 Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie , 47. 
62  “The  draft Constitution must emanate from the Congress itself: not that I wish to diminish the 
merits of the printed  draft , which is the result of conscientious study, but it is not appropriate for 
the Congress to give priority to any  draft drawn up outside of its bosom”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions , 
vol. 1, p. 324, 25/11/1830. For  Forgeur , see: Caulier-Mathy, Forgeur, Joseph; Heptia, Joseph 
Forgeur. 
63  Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 1, p. 325, 25/11/1830. For  Lebeau , see: Devillers, Lebeau (Joseph) 
and Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie, 24–25. 
64  Ganshof Van der Meersch and Vanwelkenhuyzen, La constitution belge, 575. 
65  Magit ,  De Volksraad , Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie . 
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Constitution. 66 Its basic features were generally respected, with the arrangement for 
the  Senate as the main exception. 67 At least 20 other constitutional  drafts , of diver-
gent quality and ideological persuasion, were offered to the  Congress in this peri-
od. 68 Of these, only the one by the delegates  Forgeur ,  Barbanson ,  Fleussu and  Liedts 
seems to have received any attention. 69 Its major innovation, unicameralism, was 
however not adopted. 
 Out of the same concern of safeguarding its position as the sole representative of 
the nation, the  Congress rejected the idea of submitting the new Constitution, or 
parts of it, to popular  referendum . 70 The proposal of the  democratic delegates 
Alexandre de  Robaulx and Pierre-Guillaume  Seron to let the people sanction the 
decision over the form of  state was subsequently not supported. 71  Forgeur  reacted 
furiously to De  Robaulx ’s proposal, accusing him of calling into question the 
 Congress’s  constituent  mandate :
 On a cherché un appui hors de cette enceinte (…) on vous a contesté votre mandat; on a 
refusé de vous reconnaître comme  pouvoir constituant . 72 
 This line of reasoning was continued in the new Constitution. Article  25  stated 
that all the powers must be exercised “in the manner established by the Constitution”. 
This provision ruled out the option of lawmaking by way of  referendum . Since the 
legislative  power was exclusively exercised by the  chambers and the  King , the elec-
torate was not allowed to directly intervene in the legislative process. Additionally, 
as we have seen above,  article 32 excluded the imperative  mandate , whereas  article 
43 forbade to personally present petitions to the chambers. The representatives of 
the  nation were considered to decide freely and without pressure by the 
electorate. 73 
66  Gilissen , Le caractère collégial, 86. 
67  Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie , 57. 
68  Magits ,  De Volksraad. 
69  ‘Projet de constitution présenté par MM. Forgeur, Barbanson, Fleussu et Liedts, dans la séance 
du 25 novembre 1830’,  Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 4, p. 50–55;  Gilissen ,  Le régime représentatif , 
86. 
70  Magit,  De Volksraad ,  397 . 
71  Huyttens,  Discussions , vol. 1, p. 253–260, 20/11/1830. Delegate François Pirson made a similar 
proposal in the discussion over national  independence , Huyttens,  Discussions , vol. 1, p. 161, 
17/11/1830. In addition, several  draft constitutions submitted to the Congress, by authors of 
diverging political persuasions, proposed to submit the Constitution to popular  referendum . See: 
National Archives of Belgium, Gouv. Prov. I, no. 197: Un patriote belge, ‘Projet de constitution’; 
 Courrier de la Meuse no. 260, 27/10/1830: ‘De notre nouveau pacte fondamental’. 
72  “One has looked for support outside of this assembly. (…) one has contested your  mandate ; one 
has refused to acknowledge you as constituent  power ”. Huyttens,  Discussions , vol. 1, p. 229, 
20/11/1830. 
73  Lefebvre ,  The Belgian Constitution , 38. 
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2.3  The  Legitimacy of the  Senate 
 A similar concern for the free expression of the will of the  nation  inﬂ uenced the 
debate over the  Senate . The Constitutional  Commission had proposed a bicameral 
system, with a Senate appointed by the  King . As to the senators’ term of ofﬁ ce, it 
left the choice between hereditary peerage and appointment for life. The proposal 
was a source of much controversy. 74 Many feared that a  Senate appointed by the 
 monarch would confer too much power to the latter, while putting political power in 
the hands of a hereditary  peerage was seen as a violation of the principle of equality 
before the law. The  newspaper  Den Antwerpenaer wrote: “Het is eene zottigheyd, 
want dit riekt al te veel nae het oud voorrecht van leenstelsel”. 75 Supporters of the 
 Senate saw it as a necessary institution for moderating the impetuous  democratic 
forces of the elected  Chamber and as an intermediary between the latter and the 
monarch. 76 
 In the  republican political club  Reunion Centrale , 77 a speech against the  Senate 
and the royal  veto was delivered by Joseph-Ferdinand  Toussaint , a clerk of the 
Provisional  Government with Saint-Simonian sympathies. 78 According to Toussaint, 
the concept of a  Senate so contravened the principle of national  sovereignty that, 
should it become reality, a new revolution would be unavoidable:
 Unissons tous nos efforts pour constituer une représentation nationale vraie, réelle, hors de 
l’inﬂ uence des privilèges et des cours, une représentation qui, expression de vos besoins, et 
de tous les intérêts, soit nombreuse et digne de notre conﬁ ance. Qu’à elle seule appartienne 
la puissance législative; qu’à la volonté  générale , dont elle est l’organe, obéissent reli-
gieusement tous les volontés particulières; et que la loi soit l’objet d’un culte sacré. Nous 
assurerons ainsi la liberté et le bonheur de la patrie, en restant ﬁ dèle à notre principe fonda-
mental: la souveraineté réside dans la nation. 79 
74  Magits ,  De Volksraad ; Stevens, Een belangrijke faze; Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische 
grondwetscommissie. 
75  “This is a folly because it reeks too much of the old privilege of feudalism”.  Den Antwerpenaer 
no. 98, 23/11/1830.  Den Antwerpenaer was a popular,  democratic oppositional journal from 
Antwerp, expressing a  liberal  Catholic point of view. De Borger,  Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis van 
de Antwerpse pers. Repertorium, 1794–1914, 157–159;  Witte , Het natiebegrip in het Zuidelijk 
krantendiscours aan de vooravond van de Belgische opstand (augustus 1829-juni 1830), 225. 
76  Stevens, Een belangrijke faze. 
77  Leconte, La Réunion Centrale, club patriotique, révolutionnaire et républicain;  Witte , De 
Belgische radicalen: brugﬁ guren in de democratische beweging (1830–1850), 16. 
78  Geldhof, Een orangistisch rivaal van Alexander Rodenbach. Jozef-Ferdinand Toussaint: 
Meulebeke 1806-Elsene 1885; Gofﬁ n, Toussaint (Joseph-Ferdinand). 
79  “Let us unite all our efforts to constitute a real, true, national representation, free from the inﬂ u-
ence of privileges and courts, a representation which, expressing your needs and every interest, is 
numerous and worthy of our trust. To it exclusively must the  legislative power belong; all the 
particular wills must religiously obey the general  will  in whose name it speaks; and the law must 
be the object of a sacred cult. Thus will we be able to guarantee the liberty and happiness of the 
fatherland and be faithful to our fundamental principle:  sovereignty resides in the nation”. 




 Within the  Congress too, the proposed  Senate met with ﬁ erce resistance. 
Unicameralism was one of the most conspicuous elements of the counterproposal 
launched by Joseph  Forgeur and his associates. 80 Especially those delegates whose 
political ideals were rooted in the tradition of French  republicanism considered an 
appointed  Senate as a dangerous threat for the national  sovereignty , as illustrated by 
the speech by Van  Snick . Stating that legislative  power was an inalienable and indi-
visible attribute of  sovereignty , he argued that it should exclusively belong to the 
delegates of the  nation :
 Chez nous, depuis notre régénération politique, la souveraineté est reconnue émaner de la 
nation exclusivement; la puissance législative est un des attributs essentiels, inaliénables de 
cette souveraineté; partager cet attribut, qui doit être exclusif à cette souveraineté, entre les 
délégués de la nation et les délégués de celui aux mains duquel elle aurait conﬁ é le pouvoir 
exécutif, me semble un acte attentoire à cette souveraineté: c’est la détruire au moment où 
on la proclame. 81 
 The  Congress ﬁ nally opted for an elected  Senate which, due to the very high 
property requirements for eligibility, would automatically take on an  aristocratic 
character. This original choice reﬂ ected its concern to safeguard the operation of 
national  sovereignty , unhindered by privilege or the intervention of a power of non- 
popular origin, while simultaneously building a conservative element into the 
national representation. 
2.4  Nation Versus King 
 The  debates  of the  Congress time and again pointed at a conception of  sovereignty 
where the nation governs itself through its representatives. The delegates were regu-
larly reminded that they took their  mandate from ‘the Belgian people’. The question 
of  sovereignty most explicitly surfaced in the  debate over the form of  state . At this 
occasion, Jean-Baptiste  Nothomb , secretary to the Constitutional  Commission and 
future prime minister, declared:
 L’hérédité et  l’inviolabilité sont deux ﬁ ctions politiques, deux nécessités publiques, deux 
exceptions dans l’ordre social. En face de ces ﬁ ctions apparaît, toujours menaçante, la 
80  Gilissen ,  Le régime représentatif ;  Magits ,  De Volksraad ; Nandrin, Le bicaméralisme belge et le 
Sénat en 1830–1831: fondements doctrinaux. 
81  “Since the moment of our political regeneration, it is recognised that sovereignty emanates from 
the nation exclusively; the  legislative power is one of the essential, inalienable attributes of that 
sovereignty; to subdivide this attribute, which must exclusively belong to that sovereignty, between 
the delegates of the nation and the delegates of him to whom the executive  power is entrusted, is 
in my opinion an attack on that sovereignty; it is to proclaim and to destroy it in the same instant”. 
 Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 1, p. 404, 13/12/1830. See also: De  Smaele ,  Omdat we uwe vrienden 
zijn. Religie en partij-identifi catie, 1884–1914 , 19. 
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 souveraineté du peuple, qui, dans les cas extrêmes, vient infailliblement les briser. En 
dernier résultat, c’est toujours le pays qui l’emporte. 82 
 Nothomb almost literally referred to  sovereignty as a last resort, and placed it in 
the hands of the people. His words contained an implicit  legitimation of the Belgian 
 Revolution . Royalty, according to  Nothomb , was nothing but a ‘necessary political 
ﬁ ction’. The people legally held the right to revolt against it in defence of their  sov-
ereignty .  William I had forfeited his rights to the throne for having infringed on the 
 sovereignty of the people, which was the utter source of  legitimacy . 
 Congress delegates systematically used the terms ‘ nation’ and ‘ king’ or ‘head of 
state’ in opposition to each other. Both were treated as mutually exclusive entities. 
In the report of the Central  Section on the discussion on the powers of the head of 
state, delegate Joseph-Jean  Raikem wrote:
 On a pensé que le droit de déclarer la guerre devait rester au chef de l’Etat; que la nation 
avait une garantie sufﬁ sante dans le refus des subsides qui aurait lieu de la part des cham-
bres dans le cas d’une guerre injuste. 83 
 The citation indicates that only the  chambers were considered to represent the 
nation, and that the latter was conceptually different from the head of state. Also, it 
conﬁ rms the interpretation of the  nation as a last resort, since the chambers were, by 
their control over the  budget , able to block any unwanted initiative of the  executive , 
even when it stemmed from the royal  prerogatives . In the discussion over the form 
of  state , De  Robaulx proclaimed:
 Je ne veux pas de monarchie, parce que sous elles les fonctionnaires s’habituent à croire 
qu’ils ne tiennent leurs places que du maître et non de la nation. 84 
 Again, the nation and the  King were treated as opposites, and the  nation was 
recognised as the source of all powers. 85 
 Article  80  stated that the  King only takes function after having sworn loyalty to 
the  Constitution in the presence of the united  chambers . Since the  King was only 
vested with his constitutional powers on the moment of taking the  oath , periods of 
interregnum occurred every time between the death of the reigning monarch and the 
taking of the  oath by his successor. 86 In the meantime, the  monarch’s constitutional 
powers were exercised by the Council of Ministers, under their  responsibility (art. 
82  “Heredity and inviolability are two political ﬁ ctions, two political necessities, two exceptions in 
the social order. Opposite these ﬁ ctions appears, ever menacing, the sovereignty of the people 
which, in extreme cases, comes and destroys them. In the end, the country always wins”.  Huyttens , 
 Discussions, vol. 1, p. 193, 19/11/1830. 
83  “It is our opinion that the right to declare war must stay with the head of state; the nation has a 
sufﬁ cient guarantee in the refusal of the subsidies to which the chambers will resort in case of an 
unjust war”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 4, p. 84. 
84  “I don’t want a monarchy, because it makes the functionaries believe that they hold their place 
from the master and not from the nation”. Huyttens,  Discussions, vol. 1, p. 255, 22/11/1830. 
85  Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie, 63. 
86  Ganshof Van der Meersch, Des rapports, 182. 
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79). Delegate  Beyts , insisting on the importance of establishing a  contract with the 
 King as a precondition of his taking power, said:
 Je n’admets guère (…) le principe admis en France: Le roi est mort, vive le roi! Je ne crie 
pas, Vive le roi, s’il n’a pas juré. 87 
 As with the French citizen- king who had come to power the previous  summer , 
the royal style was ‘ King of the Belgians’, not ‘of Belgium’, indicating that the 
monarch or the dynasty was not entitled to claim rights of possession on the territo-
ry. 88 Royalty in the Belgian  Constitution was, indeed, merely a constituted  power . 89 
In a speech aimed at stressing the importance of the monarch’s full acceptance of 
the Constitution, delegate Pierre Van  Meenen – who had been one of the main theo-
rists of the constitutional resistance against  William I – provided an accurate yet 
rather unmajestic description of the  monarch’s position. 90 He compared it to the 
obligation on the part of an employee to fully subscribe the  contract  offered to him 
by his future employer as a condition for his entering in function:
 On a dit qu’elle [la Constitution] ne serait arrêtée déﬁ nitivement que par l’acceptation du 
chef de l’État. Il est vrai qu’il se forme un  contrat entre lui et la nation, mais la constitution 
ne forme pas la matière de ce contrat, c’est l’acceptation du mandat que lui confère la 
nation. Le mandant est ici un être collectif de la nation constituée. L’acceptation ne peut 
mettre en question toutes les parties du  contrat . S’il en était autrement, chaque employé 
n’aurait qu’à dire, en entrant en fonctions, qu’il n’accepte que sauf des modiﬁ cations à faire 
aux lois qu’il est appelé à exécuter. 91 
 The same reasoning underlies De  Robaulx ’s heated intervention in the  debate of 
6 February 1831 on  article 7 of the transitory dispositions, concerning the timing of 
the convening of the ﬁ rst elected  Parliament . Upon  Osy ’s remark that the future 
 King might possibly not agree to these regulations, De  Robaulx exclaimed: “S’il 
n’accepte pas nos  conditions , il ne sera pas roi”, sparking applause from the benches 
87  ”I hardly agree to the principle allowed in France: the King is dead, long live the King! I will not 
cry ‘Long live the King’ if he hasn’t sworn the  oath ”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 2, p. 487, 
07/02/1831. On the absence of this principle in the Belgian Constitution:  Errera ,  Traité du droit 
public , 198. 
88  Errera ,  Traité du droit public , 195; Koll, Belgien, 493;  Witte ,  De constructie , 95. 
89 Alen ,  Treatise on Belgian Constitutional Law , 4; Molitor, Réﬂ exions sur la fonction royale, 16; 
 Müβig , L’ouverture du mouvement constitutionnel, 495. 
90  For Van  Meenen , see: Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie , 17–19; Le Roy, 
Meenen, Pierre-François Van. 
91  “It has been said that the Constitution will only become deﬁ nite upon its acceptance by the head 
of state. It is true that a contract is established between him and the nation, but the Constitution is 
not the subject matter of that contract, it is the acceptance of the  mandate  conferred to him by the 
nation. The mandator here is the collective being of the constituted nation. The acceptance cannot 
call into question the parts of the contract. Otherwise, every employee could simply refuse, when 
entering into function, to accept, unless modiﬁ cations were made to the laws he was called upon 
to execute”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 2, p. 492, 08/02/1831. 
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and the galleries. 92 The  Catholic  newspaper  Courrier de la Meuse wrote, in reaction 
to  article 4 of the  draft Constitution (the later  article 25):
 Si tous les pouvoirs émanent de la nation, celui du prince en émane certainement aussi; et 
dans ce cas, ce pouvoir ne serait qu’une délégation, qu’une commission; et c’est bien ainsi 
qu’on l’entend. 93 
 In short, royal  power was to be exercised on the terms dictated by the  nation . 
2.5  The Royal  Veto and the National  Will 
 However, this interpretation seems to be invalidated by the establishment of the 
absolute royal  veto . Article  69 stated that the  King sanctions and promulgates the 
laws. Since he cannot be forced to sign the laws presented to him by the  chambers , 
this arrangement amounts to the absolute royal  veto in  legislative matters. 94 At ﬁ rst 
sight, the  article contradicts the free exercise of national  sovereignty by the nation’s 
representatives, since it provides the  King with the power to block the legislative 
process. The Congress  debates shed a different light on the question. The  veto was 
not being discussed as a reinforcement of royal power, but as a safeguard of the will 
of the  nation . Due to the representative system, it was possible that the  chambers did 
not correctly reﬂ ect the nation’s opinion. In that case the monarch was called upon 
to guarantee that opinion by vetoing the proposed law or by calling new  elections 
(via the royal right to dissolve the chambers under  article 71), as the report of the 
Central  Section on the powers of the head of state makes clear:
 Les résolutions des chambres doivent être l’expression du vœu de la nation qu’elles 
représentent. Mais il peut arriver que l’élection ait pour résultat d’y appeler les hommes 
d’un parti, et non ceux du peuple qui les élit. Dans ce cas, la marche du chef de l’Etat serait 
entravée, ou bien il se trouverait obligé d’agir dans un sens contraire à l’intérêt général. Il 
92  “If he doesn’t accept our conditions, he will not be King”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 2, p. 484, 
06/02/1831. 
93  “If it is true that all powers emanate from the nation, those of the prince surely do so too; and if 
that be the case, his power would be nothing but a delegation or a commission; and this is precisely 
what is proposed”.  Courrier de la Meuse no. 266, 04/11/1830. The reactionary  Courrier de la 
Meuse deplored this arrangement because the Courrier favored a strong position for the monarch. 
The  newspaper represented the conservative,  Catholic opposition in Liège. Among its collabora-
tors was Etienne-Constantin de  Gerlache . See: Capitaine,  Bibliographie liégeoise. Recherches his-
toriques sur les journaux et les écrits périodiques liégeois , 166–172; Cordewiener,  Etude de la 
presse liégeoise de 1830 à 1850 et répertoire général ; Harsin,  Essai sur l’opinion publique en 
Belgique de 1815 à 1830 , 34; Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie , 15. 
94  Bivort ,  Constitution Belge expliquée et interprétée par les discussions du Pouvoir Législatif, les 
arrêts des cours supérieures de Belgique et les opinions des jurisconsultes , 14;  Errera ,  Traité du 
droit public belge , 120; Senelle,  La Constitution belge commentée , 246;  Tempels , Droit constitu-




doit donc avoir le droit de faire un appel à l’opinion du pays par la dissolution des 
chambres. 95 
 Or, in  Nothomb ’s words:
 (…) les deux chambres se contrôlant réciproquement, le roi réserve son veto pour les cas 
rares où toutes les deux ont erré. 96 
 Instead of being tools to increase the power of the  monarch , allowing him to 
pursue his own policies, the royal  veto and the right of dissolution were meant to 
guarantee the correct expression of the will of the  nation . When he thought that the 
legislative work of the  chambers did not reﬂ ect the wish of the majority of the 
people, it was the monarch’s duty to intervene on their behalf. In the terms of the 
 debates , he had to make an “appeal to the nation”, 97 so as to ensure that the  cham-
bers correctly represented “the country’s opinion” (“l’opinion du pays”). 98 In the 
 draft Constitution, only the Chamber of  Representatives was subject to the royal 
right of dissolution, since the  senators were to be appointed by the  King . Upon the 
 Congress’s decision to make the  Senate elective, the right of dissolution was 
extended to both chambers, because both now were supposed to represent the 
national  will . 
 Remarkably little attention was devoted to the choice between an  absolute and a 
 suspensive veto. Although the  suspensive veto was well known from earlier modern 
constitutions (such as the French  Constitution of 1791 ), the option counted only a 
few supporters among the delegates. The issue had been raised in two out of ten 
sections, but failed to obtain a majority in the Central  Section . During the plenary 
 debates , only delegates  Wannaar and  Henry spoke in favour of the  suspensive veto . 
Henry referred to the constitutional project proposed by  Forgeur ,  Barbanson , 
 Fleussu and  Liedts in response to the Constitutional  Commission ’s more conserva-
tive  draft Constitution. The proposal allowed  Parliament to overrule the royal  veto 
when the succeeding legislature passed the same bill with a three-quarters majori-
ty. 99  Henry elaborated on the issue by warning his fellow delegates against the threat 
95  “The decisions of the chambers must express the will of the nation which they represent. But it 
is possible that an  election results in men being called to them who are of a party and not of the 
people which elects them. In that case, the course of the head of state will be hindered, or else he 
will be obliged to act in a sense contrary to the general interest. He must therefore have the right 
to make an appeal to the opinion of the country by dissolving the chambers”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions, 
vol. 4, p. 85. 
96  “(…) since the two chambers mutually control each other, the King reserves his veto for those 
rare cases when both have erred”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 1, p. 426, 14/12/1830. 
97  Delegate  Henry , in his intervention in favour of the suspensive royal  veto , spoke of an appeal “to 
the sovereign nation”, implying yet again that the latter did not include the King.  Huyttens , 
 Discussions, vol. 2, p. 79, 10/01/1831. For the concept of the appeal to the nation, see:  Bacot , 
 Carré de Malberg et l’origine de la distinction entre souveraineté du peuple et souveraineté natio-
nale , 72; Baker, Constitution, 467; Roels,  Le concept de représentation, 94. 
98  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 4, p. 85. 
99 Art. 40: “Il [le Roi] sanctionne et promulgue la loi, ou y appose son  veto . Ce veto est suspensif. 
Il cesse et la sanction est obligée, si la même loi est reproduite et adoptée à la législature sub-
séquente par la majorité des trois quarts”. Huyttens,  Discussions , vol. 4, p. 52. 
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of royal despotism inherent in the  absolute veto . According to him, granting the 
absolute royal  veto equaled turning the  King into the sole  legislator and relegating 
 Parliament to the status of a consultative body. 100 The interventions by  Henry and 
 Wannaar failed to stir up any  debate however, and ﬁ nally they were the only ones to 
vote in favour of their amendments. 
 Clearly, the majority in  Congress was satisﬁ ed with the reasoning developed by 
 Raikem in the report of the Central  Section on the powers of the head of state. The 
report spoke of the “grave inconveniences” caused by the introduction of the  sus-
pensive veto . By making the veto suspensive, the  monarch would in effect be 
deprived of his share in the legislative  power , thus turning it into the exclusive ter-
rain of the  chambers . Such an arrangement was dangerous for the constitutional 
powers of the monarch, the report warned:
 (…) de cette manière les chambres pourraient aller jusqu’au point de faire des lois qui por-
teraient atteinte aux pouvoirs constitutionnels du chef de l’état: celui-ce se trouverait sans 
défense; car, entre les chambres et lui, qui serait le juge de la question? 101 
 In other words, the veto needed to be  absolute  so as to prevent a  Parliament hos-
tile to royal power from attacking the monarch’s position. This consideration 
bespeaks a concern for  balancing the constituted  powers typical for the Belgian 
 Constitution . The delegates may have had the example of the French  Constitution of 
1791 in mind, when continual constitutional conﬂ icts had resulted from parliamen-
tary attacks on a weak royal power, ﬁ nally leading to the downfall of both the 
Constitution and the monarchy. 
 Errera in his 1918 constitutional treatise commented that the  Congress had fore-
seen the impossibility for the  King to use his veto under a  parliamentary regime. He 
interestingly suggests that, under these circumstances, a  suspensive veto would 
have provided him with a much more important political inﬂ uence. 102 Since the 
 absolute veto was clearly intended for exceptional use only, it was of little conse-
quence in practice. Although the  Constitution did not technically contain sufﬁ cient 
guarantees for  parliamentary  government (cfr. infra),  Errera is right in asserting that 
the  King was not supposed to use the  veto against  Parliament , that is, against the 
will of the  nation . The report of the Central  Section reveals that such a use would go 
directly against the spirit of the Constitution. 
 It is nevertheless striking that the restrictions imposed on the use of the  veto were 
not made explicit in the constitutional  text . The  Congress delegates did not stop to 
consider the most extreme consequence of the constitutional system they created. 
For in the event of the  monarch blocking the legislative through his use of the  abso-
lute veto , and  Parliament paralysing the executive through its rejection of the  budget , 
100  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 2, p. 79, 10/01/1831. 
101  “(…) in this way, the Chamber could get to the point of making laws which would harm the 
constitutional powers of the head of state: the latter would ﬁ nd himself without defense, because 
who could judge the question between him and the chambers?”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 4, 
p. 84. 
102  Errera ,  Traité du droit public belge, 121 . 
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complete deadlock would be at hand. 103 Writing about the situation at the beginning 
of the twentieth century,  Errera remarked that the royal  veto had fallen in complete 
disuse, and considered its application by the monarch “unimaginable”. Even though 
the  King was constitutionally entitled to do so, his use of the  veto would not be 
tolerated by public opinion, and would therefore lead straight to a popular uprising. 
The same argument against the monarch’s  overstepping of his constitutional  man-
date was regularly used in the  Congress . In the citation above,  Nothomb mentioned 
the “ever threatening  sovereignty of the people”, standing ready to break royal 
power in the case of an extreme occurrence. Similar references to the revolutionary 
power of the people, faced with irresponsible or  unconstitutional  government, 
abound. 
 Despite this apparent weakness in the constitutional construction, political prac-
tice after 1831 neatly conformed to the  Congress’s intentions. In the course of the 
nineteenth century, the royal  veto was used on merely three occasions (1842, 1845, 
1884). 104 Each time the  King took care not to simply refuse his sanction but to issue 
a Royal Decree, thus bringing his royal  prerogative  under ministerial  responsibility . 
On all three occasions, the  veto had been debated in the Council of Ministers before-
hand and was motivated by a turnabout in the political balance. 105 As the project of 
law concerned was no longer supported by the new majority, letting it pass would 
go counter to the will of the  chambers . Vetoing it came down to applying the solu-
tion provided for by the  Constitution against the introduction of laws which did not 
correctly express the will of the  nation . 
2.6  Republican Monarchism 
 The popular origin of  sovereignty was most clearly epitomised by the choice of a 
monarch. To be sure, many delegates recognised that a people can most truly be said 
to govern itself when the ofﬁ ce of head of state is not hereditary but  eligible . The 
Constitutional  Commission had in its  draft Constitution opted for the monarchy. 106 
It did however yield to popular  republican sentiments by using the neutral term 
103  Tempels plays down the importance of the  absolute veto since its persistent use could only lead 
to anarchy. Tempels, Droit constitutionnel, 453. 
104  Errera ,  Traité du droit public belge, 121; Ganshof Van der Meersch and Vanwelkenhuyzen, La 
constitution belge, 583. Lefebvre’s assertion that the royal  veto has never been used is not sup-
ported by the facts.  Lefebvre ,  The Belgian Constitution of 1831 , 26. 
105  Errera ,  Traité du droit public belge, 121. 
106  Only one member of the Commission,  Tielemans , voted for the  republic . Tielemans was an ally 
of the republican revolutionary leader Louis de  Potter . When his colleagues voted for the monar-
chy, he resigned from the Commission. Hymans , Le Congrès national de 1830 et la Constitution 
de 1831 , 19; Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie, 35. Two others members, Van 
 Meenen and  Nothomb , voted with the majority although they were of the opinion that the choice 
between a monarch and a republic should on principle be left to the Congress.  Nothomb ,  Essai 
historique , 77. 
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‘head of state’ instead of ‘king’, hinting that the matter had not been deﬁ nitively 
settled yet. 107 Between 19 and 22 November 1830 a heated  debate , with interven-
tions by over thirty delegates, was held over the question of the form of  state . 108 The 
intensity of the  debate is somewhat surprising given the prevailing international 
political situation. The great European powers, assembled at the London  Conference , 
had made it sufﬁ ciently clear that they would not under any circumstances accept a 
republic. Since the young state depended entirely on the support of the powers for 
its survival, many delegates adopted a pragmatic attitude towards the matter. 109 
 Nevertheless, all the classical arguments of political theory were brought to bear. 
 Montesquieu was omnipresent in the arguments of both camps, turning the question 
into a  debate over the character of the Belgians and its compatibility to either form 
of  state . Interestingly, both parties agreed that the question of hereditary leadership 
was a fairly technical one. Above all, the Constitution needed to make sure that the 
 nation governed itself. The arguments used in the  debate were mainly of a practical 
nature and centered on the question which form of  state would most beneﬁ t the 
 nation’s interests as well as beﬁ t the character of its inhabitants. 110 They did not, 
however, touch on the underlying principles of the Constitution. 
 These principles were, many speakers agreed,  republican . 111 This meant, accord-
ing to their own terminology: far-reaching personal liberties, self-government (in 
the sense of lawmaking by the representatives of the people) and the responsibility 
of government to  Parliament . 112 To this end it was considered essential that all pow-
ers rest on the agreement of the people. In other words, as in the quote by  Nothomb , 
the people was considered  sovereign . There was a consensus in the  Congress that 
the new Constitution needed to contain all the elements which had for so long been 
called for by the Belgian opposition against William  I , and which would ensure the 
government’s subordination to the will of the  people : ministerial  responsibility , 
 inviolability ,  countersignature , the yearly voting of the  budget , etcetera. 113 
 Moreover,  republican and  monarchist speakers alike conceded that, except for 
 inviolability and ministerial  responsibility , this system could work under a  monarch 
as well as under a president. 114 In his inﬂ uential treatise on royal power of 1830, 
later member of the Constitutional  Commission and prime minister Joseph  Lebeau 
107  Gilissen ,  Le caractère collégial , 88;  Nothomb ,  Essai , 78. 
108  Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 1, 184–260. 
109  Hymans,  Le congrès national , 34;  Magits ,  De Volksraad ; Molitor,  La fonction royale en 
Belgique , 16. 
110  De Dijn, In overeenstemming met onze zeden en gewoonten. De intellectuele context van de 
eerste Belgische constitutie (1815–1830). 
111  Nothomb ,  Essai , 306; 428. 
112  Banning deﬁ nes self-government as “le gouvernement du pays par ses mandataires directs”, 
identifying it with the legislative work of the chambers. Banning, Histoire parlementaire depuis 
1830, 475. 
113  De  Smaele , Eclectisch en toch nieuw, 409; Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie , 
61. 
114  Barthélemy ,  Des gouvernements passés et du gouvernement à créer ; Harris, European 
Liberalism, 512; Jennings, Conceptions of England and its Constitution in Nineteenth-century 
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had already remarked that only heredity and  inviolability distinguished kingship 
from presidency. 115 What counted for Lebeau was that the political order enshrined 
liberty, regardless of the exact form that order took. He considered the English mon-
archs the only ones to have fully understood this, since, discarding any non- 
constitutional  legitimation of their power, they fully bowed to the  will of the nation. 
 The  republican priest Désiré de  Haerne admonished his fellow delegates that a 
constitutional  monarchy was nothing but a republic in disguise. It would prove 
unstable, since a monarch would not sit easy with the  sovereignty of the people 
upon which the system was based. He found it wiser therefore to declare a republic 
straight away:
 (…) il ne s’agit pas de balancer les avantages et les désavantages des deux systèmes de 
gouvernement; il s’agit de savoir si nous pouvons nous tenir à une monarchie  constitution-
nelle  représentative, qui n’est qu’une république déguisée, puisqu’elle est basée sur la sou-
veraineté du peuple. (…) Un roi  inviolable est un souverain en présence du peuple 
souverain. 116 
 Many speakers agreed that the days of the European monarchies were numbered. 
In time, they expected the  republican  form of  state to gain all of them, including 
Belgium. However, such times were not believed to be yet upon them. 117 
 Whereas the  republican  delegates warned against the struggle for power that was 
to result from the cohabitation of popular  sovereignty and monarchy, the majority 
believed that the two could coexist in harmony. Since sovereignty was safely vested 
in the  nation , a hereditary head of the executive did not threaten the ‘republican’ 
essence of the Constitution. Indeed, the expression ‘republican monarchy’, attrib-
uted to  Lafayette , was repeatedly used to describe the compromise:
 Wannaar : “Alors nous aurons les formes républicaines compatibles avec l’hérédité du chef; 
tous l’ont dit à cette tribune; ce sera la monarchie républicaine”. 118 
Alexandre  Rodenbach : “Je vote en faveur d’une monarchie républicaine (…), parce que 
sous un pareil gouvernement le peuple marche avec sécurité entre deux précipices, l’abus 
du pouvoir et l’excès de la liberté”. 119 
French Political Thought, 72; Nicolet,  L’idée républicaine en France. Essai d’histoire critique , 
407;  Stengers ,  L’action du Roi , 14. 
115  Lebeau ,  Observations sur le pouvoir royal ou examen de quelques questions relatives aux droits 
de la couronne dans les Pays Bas , 9. 
116  “(…) this is not about balancing the advantages and disadvantages of the two systems of govern-
ment; this is about knowing whether we can stick to a constitutional, representative monarchy, 
which is nothing but a republic in disguise, because it is based on the sovereignty of the people. 
(…) An inviolable  King is a sovereign in the presence of the sovereign people”.  Huyttens , 
 Discussions, vol. 1, p. 216, 20/11/1830. 
117  De Dijn, In overeenstemming met onze zeden; De Lichtervelde, Introduction, 12. 
118  “Thus, the republican forms will be made compatible with the heredity of the chief; all present 
have reiterated this: it will be a republican monarchy”. Huyttens,  Discussions, vol. 1, p. 222, 
20/11/1830. 
119  “I vote for a republican monarchy (…), because under such a government the people safely 
navigates between two abysses: abuse of power and excess of liberty”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 
1, p. 248, 22/11/1830. 
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Charles Vilain  XIIII : “Je me prononcerai, messieurs, en faveur de la monarchie constitu-
tionnelle, mais assise sur les bases les plus libérales, les plus populaires, les plus républic-
aines. Je rejette la république, parce que, rêve des âmes généreuses, elle me semble 
impraticable. Une république devrait être composée d’anges, et la société de l’an 1830 ne 
me paraît pas encore arrivée à la perfection angélique”. 120 
 In the end “la monarchie constitutionnelle représentative,  sous un chef hérédi-
taire” (“constitutional, representative monarchy, under a hereditary chief” ) was 
adopted by an overwhelming majority of 174 against 13. 121 
 Constitutional  monarchy was credited with the immense advantage of guarantee-
ing ‘ republican’ liberty without the accompanying instability. As  Wyvekens put it:
 (...) il  me paraît (…) démontré que sous la garantie d’une bonne constitution qui assure les 
droits et les devoirs de tous, nous jouirons de tous les avantages du système républicain sans 
avoir à craindre son instabilité. 122 
 Devaux , too, appreciated the combination of  republican liberty with the advan-
tages of stability and order, which he believed would result in an even greater degree 
of liberty:
 La monarchie constitutionnelle  représentative , telle que je l’entends, c’est la liberté de la 
république, avec un peu d’égalité de moins dans les formes, si l’on veut; mais aussi avec 
une immense garantie d’ordre, de stabilité, et par conséquent, en réalité, de liberté de plus 
dans les résultats. 123 
 A republican  system , it was feared, would entail continual power struggles 
between parties and ambitious individuals. Presidential  elections especially were 
dreaded.  Monarchist delegates depicted them as recurring moments of profound 
crisis. The passions and rivalries they unleashed threatened to undermine the state 
in its very existence. The choice for a  hereditary head of state would prevent these 
disorders, on the condition that its powers were clearly circumscribed by the 
Constitution. In  Destriveaux ’ words:
 Dans le pacte qui nous unira, rédigeons en lois de précaution les prévisions contre les dangers 
de l’hérédité, élevons un roi sur un trône national, donnons-lui d’une main la couronne et de 
l’autre l’acte qui enferme les conditions de son pouvoir et les garanties de nos libertés. 124 
120  “Gentlemen, I will pronounce in favor of the constitutional  monarchy , but based upon the most 
liberal, popular, republican foundations. I reject the republic, that dream of generous minds, 
because I think it is impracticable. A republic would need to be composed of angels, and society in 
1830 has not yet, I think, reached such angelic perfection”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 1, p. 199, 
19/11/1830. 
121  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 1, p. 259, 22/11/1830. 
122  “(...) I think (…) it has been proven that, under the protection of a good Constitution guarantee-
ing the rights and duties of all, we will enjoy all the advantages of a republican system without 
having to fear its instability”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 1, p. 185, 19/11/1830. 
123  “Constitutional, representative  monarchy  as I understand it, means the liberty of the republic, 
with a little less equality in its forms maybe, but with an immense guarantee of order and stability, 
and consequently, with more liberty in its results”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 1, p. 213, 
20/11/1830. 
124  “Let us, in the pact that will unite us, formulate the measures against the dangers of heredity as 
precautionary laws, let us raise a King on a national throne, let us give him in one hand the crown 
B. Deseure
117
 The proof of the  republican  foundations was that the  monarch received his  man-
date from the people via its representatives in  Congress . According to the  monar-
chist delegate  Leclercq , the essence of the system consisted in the people making its 
own laws, and in the power of the  monarch as the head of the  executive being clearly 
circumscribed by the Constitution and being subject to ministerial  responsibility :
 Qui fait les lois dans une monarchie constitutionnelle  représentative ? Des hommes élus par 
tous les citoyens que leur position sociale intéresse au maintien et aux progrès de l’ordre et 
de la prospérité générale; des hommes qui représentent tous les intérêts, et par eux la nation; 
des hommes qu’enchaînent des principes consacrés par la Constitution. (…) Qui exécute les 
lois sous ce gouvernement? Un chef héréditaire il est vrai, et ce chef peut être vicieux; mais 
de combien de barrières ses vices ne seront-ils pas entourés? 125 
 Even when the head of state proved vicious, his vices were safely surrounded by 
unshakeable constitutional barriers. Another description of the system was provided 
by Viscount Hippolyte Vilain  XIIII in a brochure he published shortly before the 
meeting of the  Congress , to which he was subsequently elected. For Vilain  XIIII , 
constitutional  monarchies  were characterised by their combination of  republican 
 customs and monarchical calm. The vigilance of the Belgian people would make 
sure to remind the future  monarch of his duties laid down in the Constitution. Being 
the cornerstone of the whole ediﬁ ce, it established a  contract  between the  sovereign 
people and himself:
 La monarchie constitutionnelle est là pour remplir ce but admirable, institution des sociétés 
modernes qui concilie la force des mœurs républicaines avec le calme et l’élégance des 
habitudes monarchiques, surtout quand par un pacte consacrant la  souveraineté du peuple, 
celui-ci trouve la garantie du  contrat , non dans les serments du chef héréditaire, mais dans 
la ligne impérieuse des devoirs que le souverain doit suivre, et dans l’énergie toujours 
prompte, toujours active des citoyens à la lui faire observer. (…) Le congrès national sera 
appelé avant tout à poser cette pierre angulaire de l’édiﬁ ce; ce n’est qu’après la confection 
de la charte qu’on procèdera à l’élection du chef (…). Toute souveraineté émane du peuple; 
ce principe doit être l’intitulé de la nouvelle loi, plus de droit  divin , plus de loi octroyée, 
plus de légitimité en dehors de la  volonté nationale. Tel est le pacte constitutio[n]nel ainsi 
que nous le concevons entre le peuple Belge et son futur souverain. 126 
and in the other the charter containing the conditions of his power and the guarantees of our lib-
erty”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 1, p. 199, 19/11/1830. 
125  “Who makes the laws in a constitutional, representative  monarchy ? Men elected by all the citi-
zens whose social position gives them an interest in the maintenance and the progress of order and 
in general prosperity; men who represent all interests, and by these the nation; men who are bound 
by the principles consecrated by the Constitution. (…) Who executes the laws under such a gov-
ernment? A hereditary chief, it is true, and this chief may be vicious; but think of all the barriers 
that will surround his vices!”  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 1, p. 185, 19/11/1830. 
126  “Constitutional  monarchy is there to fulﬁ l that admirable goal, that institution of modern societ-
ies which reconciles the power of republican manners with the calm and elegance of monarchical 
customs. Especially so when, by a pact consecrating the  sovereignty of the people, the latter ﬁ nds 
the guarantee of the contract not in the  oath taken by the hereditary chief, but in the imperious line 
of duties which the monarch must follow, and in the ever prompt and active energy of the citizens 
to make him respect it. (…) The National  Congress will, before anything else, be called upon to lay 
this cornerstone of the building; only after the confection of the charter will we proceed to elect a 
chief (…). All sovereignty emanates from the people, this principle must be the title of the new 
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2.7  The King-Magistrate 
 Once the choice for the form of  state was made, a candidate for the throne needed 
to be found. The quest for a  king was harder than foreseen. Contrary to most of its 
constituent deliberations, the  Congress’s choice for a monarch heavily depended on 
the opinion of the  European powers. 127 Initially, the Prince of  Orange seemed to 
stand a good chance. However, due to the growing animosity against the House of 
Nassau, the  Congress voted the perpetual exclusion of that dynasty. 128 In early 
February 1831, it presented the Belgian crown to the Duke of  Nemours , a son of 
Louis- Philippe . 129 The latter declined the offer under the pressure of international 
diplomacy, which agitated against an expansion of France’s sphere of inﬂ uence. 130 
The  Constitution had in the meantime been adopted on the 7th of February 131 and 
proclaimed on the 11th, with the name of the future  King provisionally left blank. 132 
 The function of head of state was entrusted to a  Regent in the person of Baron 
Erasme-Louis Surlet de  Chokier , who had until that time acted as president of the 
Congress. 133 The  Constitution came into force on 25 February, the day of the 
 Regent’s taking of the constitutional  oath . 134 Surlet de  Chokier  prudently respected 
his pledge of allegiance to the representatives of the nation, up to the point of being 
accused of indecisiveness. 135 Just like the laws issued by the National  Congress , his 
decrees were promulgated ‘in the name of the Belgian people’. He regularly stressed 
that all the powers he held emanated from the ‘sovereign Congress’, as in a procla-
mation of 6 July 1831:
 Elle [l’assemblée] seule représente la nation; elle seule a le droit de donner des lois au pays. 
C’est du Congrès que je tiens mes pouvoirs, et je ne les ai reçus que pour faire exécuter les 
lois. Si je manquais à ce devoir, je violerais et mon mandat et mes sermens. 136 
law, no more divine right, no more granted law, no more  legitimacy outside of the national will”. 
Such is the constitutional pact, as we conceive it, between the Belgian people and its future sover-
eign”. Vilain  XIIII , Appel au Congrès, par un ami de la patrie. For the author, see: Van Kalken, 
Vilain XIIII (Charles-Hippolyte, vicomte). 
127  Magits,  De Volksraad , xxxii;  Witte ,  De constructie, 79. 
128  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 1, p. 319, 23/11/1830. 
129  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 2, p. 455, 03/02/1831. 
130  Fishman,  Diplomacy and Revolution. The London Conference of 1830 and the Belgian Revolt , 
105;  Witte ,  De constructie, 79. 
131  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 2, p. 488, 07/02/1831;  Bulletin des arrêtés et actes du Gouvernement 
Provisoire de la Belgique no. 14, p. 175, 07/02/1831. 
132  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 2, p. 502, 07/02/1831. 
133  François, Surlet de Chokier, Erasme, Louis. 
134  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 2, p. 592, 25/02/1831;  Bulletin des arrêtés et actes du Gouvernement 
Provisoire de la Belgique no. 16, p. 228, 25/02/1831. Except the legislative and constituent  powers 
 and the competence to appoint the head of state, which remained in the hands of the Congress. 
135  Witte , De Belgische radicalen, 17. 
136  “(…) Only she [the assembly] represents the Nation; only she has the right to give laws to the 
land. I hold my powers from the Congress and I have only received them to execute its laws. If I 
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 Thus, the  Constitution was fully operative several months before Leopold of 
Saxe- Coburg was elected  King . His candidature was agreed to on the condition of 
his full acceptance of the Constitution drawn up by the  Congress .  Le  Courrier 
commented:
 Pour porter tous les fruits que nous avons droit d’en attendre, notre révolution doit monter 
sur le trône du premier roi des Belges, et s’y asseoir intacte à côté de lui. 137 
 Newspapers tellingly referred to the monarch as the “ King -magistrate” or “the 
supreme magistrate”. 138 Some even feared that it would be hard to ﬁ nd a candidate 
for the throne who was willing to accept so many limitations to royal power, espe-
cially when he descended from any of the ancient royal dynasties:
 Le rejeton d’une famille souveraine qui règne par le droit de naissance, à travers une longue 
série de générations, serait mal assis sur un trône grossièrement refaçonné par les mains 
révolutionnaires du people 139 ; Qui sait si un roi est possible dans la vaste démocratie que le 
congrès organise? (…) Qui sait si un prince quelconque se soutiendra sur le trône nominal 
que le congrès lui élève? 140 
 Leopold indeed only grudgingly accepted the Constitution. To the  Congress del-
egation that came to offer him the crown, he replied:
 Messieurs, vous avez rudement traité la royauté, qui n’était pas là pour se défendre. Votre 
charte est bien démocratique; cependant, je crois qu’en y mettant de la bonne volonté de 
part et d’autre, on peut encore marcher. 141 
would fail to meet this duty, I would violate both my  mandate  and my oaths”.  Courrier de la Meuse 
no. 161, 07/07/1831. 
137  “In order to bear all the fruits that we are entitled to expect from it, our revolution must mount 
the throne of the ﬁ rst King of the Belgians, and take its seat there, next to him, undamaged”.  Le 
Courrier no. 120, 20/04/1831. 
138  Courrier de la Meuse no. 310, 25/12/1830;  Courrier des Pays-Bas no. 343, 09/12/1830;  Le 
Courrier no. 104, 01/05/1831. In the French  Constitution of 1791 , the term ‘premier fonctionnaire 
public’ was used.  Wigny ,  Droit constitutionnel, 222. 
139  “The scion of a sovereign family that has reigned by right of birth, through a long series of 
generations, would sit uneasily on a throne so grossly refashioned by the hands of a revolutionary 
people”.  Le Courrier no. 25, 25/01/1831. 
140  “Who knows whether a  King is possible in the vast democracy organised by the Congress? (…) 
Who knows whether a prince will sustain himself on the nominal throne erected for him by the 
Congress?”  Le Courrier no. 15, 15/01/1831. See also  Le  Courrier de la Meuse no. 310, 25/12/1830: 
“La crainte du despotisme des rois (…) fera triompher la république dans toutes les institutions 
importantes. La monarchie ne sera qu’un mot, et la république sera un fait. Et par conséquent, on 
pourra se demander aujourd’hui si l’on trouvera pour un pareil royaume un prince grande proprié-
taire et généralement respecté? A bien envisager la chose, cette dignité, quoique déclarée hérédi-
taire, ne doit pas tenter beaucoup; car cette prétendue hérédité n’aveuglera aucun homme sensé”. 
141  “Gentlemen, you have rudely treated royalty, which was not there to defend itself. Your charter 
is democratic indeed; nonetheless, I think that, with some goodwill on both sides, it can still work”. 
Molitor,  Réfl exions sur la fonction royale , 14. It seems that these initial hopes were soon dissi-
pated, for in 1842 he wrote to his niece,  Queen Victoria : “A herd of mad  democrats , in the absence 
of anything or anyone representing a government, fabricated in 1830 a Constitution in which they 
collected every means hitherto invented to render government, whatever be its name, next to 
impossible”.  Stengers ,  L’action du Roi , 26. 
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 Leopold , who on a later occasion called the Belgian institutions “quasi- 
republican” , fully realised that the  Constitution was not based on the monarchical 
 principle . 142 The inauguration ceremony on the Brussels Place Royale on 21 July 
1831 was organised around  Leopold’s public taking of the  oath . Upon his arrival in 
Brussels, he was greeted by mayor Nicolas Rouppe as the “elect of the nation” and 
reminded of his due respect for the Constitution:
 Elu de la nation, prince magnanime, venez prendre possession du trône où vous appellent 
les acclamations unanimes d’un peuple libre. Vous maintiendrez, Sire, notre charte et nos 
immunités. 143 
 In his inaugural speech,  Leopold emphasised the popular origin of the  Constitution 
and the power which had created it:
 Cette constitution émane entièrement de vous, et cette circonstance, due à la position où 
s’est trouvé le pays, me paraît heureuse. Elle a éloigné des collisions qui pouvaient s’élever 
entre divers pouvoirs et altérer l’harmonie qui doit régner entre eux. 144 
 After  Leopold ’s taking of the  oath in the hands of the president of the  Congress , 
the delegates retreated to their assembly hall in order to conclude their ﬁ nal session. 
In his closing speech, president De  Gerlache stressed the popular origin of the 
power held by the newly appointed  King :
 Vous avez une charte, un gouvernement régulier, un roi, un roi légitime de par le peuple, et 
certes il est permis de croire qu’ici la voix du peuple est encore la voix de Dieu! 145 
 De  Gerlache ’s formulation of the voice of the people as the ultimate source of 
 legitimacy was quoted in the article covering the events of 21 July in the ofﬁ cial 
 newspaper  Moniteur belge .  Leopold was not only said to have recognised the prin-
ciples of the Belgian  Revolution , but also to incarnate it in his person:
 La Révolution avait adopté Léopold;  Léopold adopte à son tour la  révolution ; il n’en renie 
aucun principe, aucune conséquence. Elle s’est faite homme en lui. Il n’y a là ni droit  divin , 
ni quasi-légitimité; toutes les ﬁ ctions tombent devant la réalité. 146 
142  Stengers ,  L’action du Roi , 28. 
143  “Elect of the  nation , magnanimous prince, come and take possession of the throne to which you 
are called by the unanimous acclamations of a free people. You will, Sire, maintain our charter and 
our immunities”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 3, p. 615, 21/07/1831. 
144  “This Constitution emanates entirely from you, and this circumstance, which is due to the posi-
tion in which the country found itself, is, I think, a happy one. It has averted potential collisions 
between the various powers which would alter the harmony that must reign between them”. 
 Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 3, p. 619, 21/07/1831. 
145  “You have a Constitution, a regular government, a King; a King who is  legitimate because of the 
people, and it can certainly be imagined that in this, the voice of the people is the voice of God!” 
 Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 3, p. 622, 21/07/1831. 
146  “The Revolution had adopted  Leopold ; Leopold in turn adopts the Revolution; he renounces 
neither its principle nor its consequences. In him, it takes form. There is neither divine right, nor 
quasi- legitimacy ; all these ﬁ ctions succumb before reality”.  Moniteur belge no. 37, 22/07/1831. 
The  Moniteur was created as ofﬁ cial  newspaper on 16 June 1831. Els  Witte ,  De Moniteur belge, 
de regering en het parlement tijdens het unionisme, 1831–1845 . 
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 On  Leopold ’s arrival in Belgium,  Le  Courrier wrote:
 Que  Léopold , en mettant le pied sur le rivage de sa nouvelle patrie, se dépouille de ce qui 
pourrait rester encore au fond de ses souvenirs de préjugés gothiques, d’inﬂ uences 
étrangères: qu’il prenne la ferme résolution de ne jamais renier son origine, le peuple, qui 
seul l’a fait roi. (…) Qu’il se rappelle surtout qu’en se rendant en Belgique, il vient sanc-
tionner une révolution. 147 
 Le  Belge wrote:
 (…) il faut aussi que le prince, que le choix du congrès appela à régner sur nous, se pénètre 
de la grande vérité si souvent répétée et presque toujours inutilement: les rois sont faits pour 
les peuples, et non les peuples pour les rois. 148 
2.8  The Constitutional Powers of the King 
 Given the arguments above, it can safely be said that ‘ nation’ in  article 25 of the 
Belgian  Constitution does not refer to any kind of compromise between royal and 
popular power, but instead expresses the exclusively popular origin of sovereignty. 
The  mandate  of the  King rested on the  popular will, thus relegating his role in the 
Belgian constitutional ediﬁ ce to that of a  pouvoir constitué . However,  article 25 
clearly distinguishes the origin of sovereignty from its exercise: “They [the powers] 
are exercised in the manner established by the Constitution”. Although the  Nation is 
the sole source of sovereignty, it does not exercise it in its entirety. The sovereign 
powers are delegated to a series of bodies which exercise them in the way estab-
lished by the Constitution. The question of the constitutional powers of the  King 
must therefore be distinguished from their origin. 
 The role and functions of the monarch were extensively debated in the  Congress 
when the issue of the form of  state came to the fore. The  debates  were strongly 
pervaded by the spirit of Benjamin  Constant . Paraphrasing the second chapter of his 
 Principes de politique ,  monarchist speakers described the monarch as a neutral 
power, whose task it was to moderate between the other powers so as to guarantee 
their harmonious collaboration. To be sure, the delegates reinterpreted  Constant’s 
147  “May Leopold, on setting foot on the shores of his new fatherland, shake off every trace that 
could possibly remain in the depths of his memories of those gothic prejudices, of foreign inﬂ u-
ences; may he take the ﬁ rm resolution never to renounce his origin: the people, which alone has 
made him King. (…) May he particularly remember that, in coming to Belgium, he comes to sanc-
tion a Revolution”.  Le Courrier no. 197, 16/07/1831. 
148  “(…) the Prince, called to reign over us by the choice of the Congress, must enshrine this great 
truth, which has so many times been repeated, but almost always in vain: Kings are made for the 
people, and not the other way around”. Pinheiro- Ferreira traces the quote back to  Vattel : Vattel and 
Pinheiro-Ferreira,  Le droit des gens, p. 480.  Le Belge no. 288, 15/10/1830.  Le Belge was a  liberal 
 oppositional  newspaper with  radical tendencies, based in Brussels. Its editor, Adolphe  Levae , was 
a sympathizer of Louis de  Potter , who also published in it. Harsin,  Essai sur l’opinion publique, 
29,  Witte , Het natiebegrip, 225; Wouters, De Brusselse radikale pers in de eerste roes van de onaf-
hanklijkheid (1830–1844), 141. 
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theory rather freely, since he himself had intended his neutral monarch as a fourth 
power, ‘ﬂ oating above the others’, whilst the executive  power was entrusted to a 
separate body. 149 
 While the delegates saw no wrong in putting both the  executive and ‘neutral’ 
powers in the hands of the  King , they strongly insisted on his moderating role. 150 He 
was not to act on any power of his own, but he had to intervene in the actions of the 
other  powers when the interests of the nation required it. For him to be able to do so, 
the heredity principle was considered an essential prerequisite. It was often repeated 
that, in order to survive, every state organisation must contain elements of both 
movement and stability. The permanent character of royal power was necessary to 
counterbalance the volatility and changeability of the elected  chambers , since insta-
bility was harmful to the State. The most comprehensive argumentation of this kind 
was provided by  Nothomb :
 Il y a stabilité dès qu’il existe au centre de l’ordre politique un pouvoir qui se perpétue de 
lui-même et qui échappe à toutes les vicissitudes humaines. (…) Le pouvoir qui se main-
tient par l’hérédité et  l’inviolabilité n’est qu’un pouvoir modérateur. La souveraineté se 
compose de la volonté et de l’exécution. La volonté est placée dans la représentation natio-
nale, l’exécution dans le ministère. Le pouvoir permanent inﬂ ue sur la volonté par l’initiative 
et le  veto , et par la dissolution de la chambre élective; sur l’exécution par le choix des 
ministres et par le droit de grâce. Il n’a pas d’action proprement dite, mais il provoque ou 
empêche l’action de tous les autres pouvoirs qui, autour de lui, se créent ou se renouvellent 
par l’élection. 151 
 Deﬁ ning ‘will’ and ‘execution’ as the component parts of sovereignty,  Nothomb 
placed the ﬁ rst in the  Parliament and the second in the  ministry . The  King or ‘per-
manent power’ was in a position to inﬂ uence both via his  prerogatives , without 
however having a terrain of action of his own. Thus, the monarch was granted a 
share in  sovereignty , but exclusively by delegation, and on the conditions stipulated 
by the  nation and listed in the Constitution. The same idea underlies the intervention 
of De Theux de Meylandt, who spoke of:
 (...) une dynastie qui sera de notre choix, qui ne sera appelée à la souveraineté que lorsque 
nous aurons établi une constitution éminemment libérale, et lorsque nous aurons complété 
toutes les lois organiques de cette constitution. 152 
149  Constant ,  Principes de politique, 40. 
150  E.g. the intervention by  Forgeur : “Le chef de l’État n’aura qu’un pouvoir neutre; il rectiﬁ era 
l’action de tous les pouvoirs. L’exécution sera dans le ministère; si le ministère est inhabile, il sera 
privé des moyens de gouvernement”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 1, p. 226, 20/11/1830. 
151  “There is stability when in the center of the political order exists a power which perpetuates 
itself and which escapes all human vicissitudes. (…) The power which maintains itself through 
heredity and  inviolability  is only a moderating power. Sovereignty is composed of will and action. 
The will is placed in the national representation, the execution in the ministry. The permanent 
power inﬂ uences the will through the initiative and the veto, and through the dissolution of the 
elected Chamber; the execution through the choice of the ministers and the right of pardon. He 
doesn’t really act himself, but he provokes or prevents the action of the other powers around him 
which are created or renewed via  election ”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 1, p. 193, 19/11/1830. 
152  “(...) a dynasty which will be of our own choice, and which will only be called to sovereignty 
after we will have established an eminently liberal Constitution, and after we will have completed 
all the organic laws of this Constitution”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 1, p. 224, 20/11/1830. 
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 Nonetheless, the  monarch’s constitutional  powers were extensive. Alongside 
being part of the legislative  power (art. 26), heading the executive (art. 29) and dis-
posing of the absolute legislative veto (art. 69) and the right to dissolve  Parliament 
(art. 71), his  prerogatives included the command of the armed forces, the rights to 
declare war and conclude treaties and the rights of pardon and coinage (art. 68). He 
furthermore appointed the ministers as well as a range of civil servants and judges 
(art. 65, 66, 99, 101) and created  nobility (art. 75). Moreover, the  Constitution 
granted the King a share in constituent  sovereignty in the case of  constitutional revi-
sion (art. 131). When the sitting  chambers declared a number of articles subject to 
revision, Parliament was dissolved and new  elections ensued. The new chambers 
decided on the  revision in common agreement with the King. 153 This arrangement is 
consistent with the argumentation of the Central  Section concerning the royal  veto 
for normal  legislation . If it was feared that a  Parliament hostile to the  King might 
attempt to threaten the latter’s constitutional position through legislative initiatives, 
the same was a fortiori true for a constituent  assembly . 
 It was however impossible for the  monarch to use these powers autonomously. 
Except for the ‘passive’ use of the royal  veto and the appointment and dismissal of 
ministers, all of his actions were subject to ministerial  responsibility through the 
obligatory  countersign . As  Lebeau put it:
 La royauté, en effet, n’est pas, à proprement parler, un pouvoir. Comment dire qu’il y ait 
pouvoir, lorsque toute faculté d’agir est interdite sans l’assentiment d’autrui? Telle est la 
position de la couronne, assujettie qu’elle est par le contreseing à la volonté du conseil. 154 
 Lebeau went on to say that the Council of Ministers itself was controlled by the 
 Parliament . Even if few speakers went as far as  Lebeau , it is clear from the  debates 
 that the  King was expected to act in accordance with the will of  Parliament . For the 
delegates, the ultimate guarantee for aligning the monarch’s conduct with the 
national  will  was the yearly vote over the  budget . Time and again they testiﬁ ed to 
their belief that the budget was Parliament’s key to controlling the government. 
 Lebeau for example used the argument to cut down the discussion over the royal 
 prerogatives . To Van  Meenen ’s insistent demand for a constitutional clause forbid-
ding the monarch to conclude treaties that risked to ﬁ nancially burden the State, 
 Lebeau replied:
153  Pierre Wigny’s objection that the King cannot really refuse to sanction a constitutional  revision 
rests on evidence provided by Belgian political custom rather than by the provisions of the 
Constitution itself:  Wigny ,  Droit constitutionnel , 223; 618. 
154  “Indeed, royalty doesn’t really have any power. How can one say that it has power, when its 
every faculty of action is forbidden without the approval of someone else? That is the position of 
the Crown, subjected as it is, by the countersign, to the will of the council”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions , 
vol. 1, p. 208, 20/11/1830. 
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 C’est inutile, parce que les chambres votent le  budget , et que par conséquent on ne peut 
grever l’État sans leur assentiment; et quand le roi reconnaîtrait une dette de vingt millions, 
il ne pourrait en grever l’État, parce qu’on lui refuserait les subsides. 155 
 A similar remark was made by the Count  d’Arschot in reply to Le  Bègue ’s pro-
posal to abolish the royal  prerogative  to declare war. Le  Bègue found this a too 
dangerous  prerogative  because it gave the  monarch the right to put the people’s lives 
at risk.  D’Arschot reminded him “that the vote over the army is annual, and that the 
 King consequently disposes as little of our lives as he disposes of our pennies”. 156 
 Lebeau predicted a  parliamentary system in which the vote over the  budget came 
down to a vote of conﬁ dence over the cabinet:
 La chambre, une fois composée, conﬁ rme, modiﬁ e ou renvoie le ministère, selon le degré 
de conﬁ ance ou de déﬁ ance qu’il lui inspire. La chambre élective, ouvrant et fermant à 
volonté la bourse des contribuables, tient dans sa main la destinée du cabinet; elle impose à 
la couronne ses exclusions et ses choix; elle élit donc en réalité, quoique indirectement, le 
ministère tout entier. Or, le ministère, ainsi élu ou conﬁ rmé, ne peut vivre qu’à la condition 
d’administrer selon le vœu de la majorité de la chambre; c’est-à-dire selon le vœu du pays 
qu’elle est censée représenter. 157 
 The monarch’s only real action was the choice of ministers, but even that was 
imposed on him by the chambers. 
 One cannot fail to remark that the keystone of the system described by  Lebeau , 
the political responsibility of  ministers to  Parliament , was missing from the 
 Constitution . 158 Although the question wasn’t explicitly discussed, it is clear from 
 Lebeau ’s account that he considered it an unnecessary measure. In his view, the 
control over the  budget sufﬁ ced to force the  King to take his ministers out of the 
 parliamentary  majority. By not inscribing the political responsibility of  ministers 
155  “It is useless, because the chambers vote the  budget , and consequently one cannot burden the 
State without their consent; and when the King would contract a debt of 20 million, he could not 
burden the State with it, because one would refuse to vote his subsidies”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions, 
vol. 2, p. 77, 10/01/1831. 
156  “(…) le comte  d’Arschot rappelle que le vote sur l’armée est annuel et que, par conséquent, le 
roi ne dispose pas plus de nos vies que de nos écus”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 2, p. 77, 
10/01/1831. 
157  “Once it will have been composed, the Chamber will conﬁ rm, modify or dismiss the ministry, 
according to the degree of conﬁ dence or distrust it inspires in it. The elective Chamber, opening or 
closing the taxpayers’ purse at will, holds the cabinet’s destiny in its hands. It imposes its exclu-
sions and its choices on the King; so that in reality it elects the whole ministry, be it indirectly. The 
ministry, being elected or conﬁ rmed in this way, can only live on the condition of administering 
according to the will of the majority of the Chamber; in other words, according to the will of the 
country it must represent”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 1, p. 208, 20/11/1830. 
158  Ganshof Van der Meersch, Des rapports entre le Chef de l’Etat et le gouvernement en droit 
constitutionnel belge, 183;  Gilissen , Die belgische Verfassung von 1831, 62; Koll, Belgien, 499. 
Articles 63 and 64 stipulated the juridical responsibility of  ministers , but not their political respon-
sibility to  Parliament . See:  Müβig , L’ouverture du mouvement constitutionnel, 499; Van Velzen, 
 De ongekende ministeriële verantwoordelijkheid. Theorie en praktijk, 1813–1840. This fact tends 
to be overlooked in accounts that attribute a pivotal position to the Belgian Constitution in the turn 
from constitutional to parliamentary  government . See for example: Luyten and Magnette, Het 
parlementarisme in België; Mirkine- Guetzévitch , L’histoire constitutionnelle comparée. 
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into the Constitution, the  Congress did however create ambiguity. Even if the limi-
tation of royal power in favour of the representatives of the people certainly was one 
of the Congress’s guiding principles, the  debates do not allow to assess to what 
extent  Lebeau ’s vision on  parliamentary government was shared by his colleagues. 
Further research is therefore needed. It is however certain that the realisation of this 
vision in practice came only much later. 
 Contrary to what some authors have concluded with hindsight on developments 
in the second half of the nineteenth century,  parliamentary  government didn’t mate-
rialise in the ﬁ rst decades after the  Constitution’s promulgation. 159 True, from a very 
early stage  Leopold I took care to appoint ministers who enjoyed parliamentary 
support. As soon as 1833, after using his prerogative to dissolve the Chamber of 
 Representatives because it proved unable to form a government,  Leopold stipulated 
by decree that governments could only function when being supported by stable 
parliamentary majorities. 160 Nonetheless, the ﬁ rst decades of  Leopold ’s reign have 
been characterised as “a semi- parliamentary  system with a monarchical 
counterpart” 161 or even a “monarchical constitutionalism with precedence for 
 Parliament ”. 162 Due to the unionist composition of cabinets (i.e. composed of min-
isters from both rivalling political blocs,  Catholic and  liberal , alike) and the absence 
of formal party organisations in this period, it was not exactly clear which parlia-
mentary majority they actually represented. 163 Belgium’s ﬁ rst  King used the advan-
tage to strengthen his position vis-à-vis the  Parliament and to keep a ﬁ rm grip on the 
 executive . 164 Only after 1857, when the last unionist alliance shattered, did the 
 King ’s inﬂ uence on the government diminish. 165 Thus, the exact balance of  powers 
in the Belgian political order bore the mark of political custom as much as of con-
stitutional provisions. 166 
159  For examples of such accounts, see: Böckenförde, Der Verfassungstyp der deutschen konstitu-
tionellen Monarchie im 19. Jahrhundert; Fusilier,  Les monarchies parlementaires. Etudes sur les 
systèmes de gouvernement , 360; Mirkine- Guetzévitch , 1830 dans l’histoire constitutionnelle de 
l’Europe. 
160  Gilissen ,  Le régime représentatif , 114. 
161  Witte , De evolutie van de rol der partijen in het Belgische parlementaire regeringssysteem, 96. 
162  Kirsch, Monarch und Parlament im 19. Jahrhundert: der monarchische Konstitutionalismus als 
europäischer Verfassungstyp - Frankreich im Vergleich, 190. In 1918,  Errera remarked that the 
form of  state inscribed in the Constitution did not conform to political practice any more: “La 
monarchie belge est strictement parlementaire et non point seulement constitutionnelle et  représen-
tative ”.  Errera ,  Traité du droit public belge , 116. Parliamentarism developed over time, resting on 
political custom as much as on constitutional provisions. See also:  Müβig , L’ouverture du mouve-
ment constitutionnel, 515. 
163  De  Smaele , Politieke partijen in de Kamer, 1830–1914. 
164  Senelle judges that  Leopold , despite faithfully respecting the letter of the Constitution, mani-
festly overstepped the limits of the role intended for him by the Congress. Senelle, Le monarque 
constitutionnel en Belgique, 56. 
165  Van den Wijngaert et al.,  België en zijn koningen. Monarchie & macht, 165 . 
166  For the evolution of this balance over time, see:  Stengers ,  L’action du Roi en Belgique depuis 
1831: pouvoir et infl uence ; Van den Wijngaert et al.,  België en zijn koningen. 
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3  National or Popular Sovereignty? 
3.1  A False Opposition 
 In spite of its underdetermined formulation,  article 25 can thus safely be said to 
proclaim national  sovereignty in the sense of  sovereignty from below. 167 This did 
not, however, avert the dangerous ambiguity pointed at by  Grenier at the beginning 
of this chapter. Although it may have been clear to all that the  nation was the ulti-
mate source of  legitimacy and that the members of  Parliament represented it (at the 
exclusion of the  King ), the  article did not specify of whom the sovereign  nation was 
composed, nor who was entitled to membership.  Grenier ’s warning bespeaks his 
fear of a narrow, elitist interpretation of the concept of  nation , as foreshadowed by 
the composition of the  Congress itself:
 (…) le Congrès ne représente que ceux qui l’ont nommé; c’est-à-dire, la propriété notable, 
quelques professions libérales et le corps du clergé. Il s’ensuit que le Congrès, bien qu’il 
n’agisse entièrement que dans l’intérêt de la nation, ne représente point la nation, mais les 
notabilités seulement. Tous les citoyens n’ont pas concouru à son élection. 168 
 With his remark,  Grenier laid bare the thorny issue of the distinction between 
 popular and national  sovereignty . It is surprising how little attention has been given 
to this  semantic question, especially given the almost complete lack of  debate in the 
 Congress over  article 25. At no point in its lengthy deliberations did the Congress 
take care to deﬁ ne the central concept on which in grounded the  legitimacy of its 
existence as well as of its primary legacy, the  Constitution . Whether the undisputed 
acceptance of this notion must be seen as a sign of a commonly shared understand-
ing about its meaning among the delegates, or whether the vagueness of the term 
conveniently cloaked fundamental disagreement, or whether the pressing circum-
stances of the  Revolution simply did not allow enough time for profound theoretical 
reﬂ ection, remains a matter of debate. What is sure is that it has facilitated the 
development of diverging interpretations over time. 
 Today’s constitutional  manuals are unambiguous over the  meaning of ‘ nation ’ in 
the Belgian  Constitution . For André  Alen , it is: “an abstract, indivisible collectivity 
comprising the citizens of the past, the present and the future”. 169 John  Gilissen , 
while admitting that the term didn’t have a ﬁ xed meaning in the political science of 
the time,  deﬁ nes it as “a community of people who want to live together” but not 
coinciding with the members of that community. 170 Pierre  Wigny calls it “collective 
being to which a political organisation has given a juridical unity which expresses 
167  De  Smaele ,  Omdat we uwe vrienden zijn , 30. 
168  “The Congress represents only those who have constitued it; in other words: landed property, 
some liberal professions and the clergy. It follows that the Congress, although it entirely acts in the 
interest of the  nation , doesn’t represent the nation but only the notables. Not all citizens have con-
tributed to its  election ”.  Grenier ,  Examen du projet de constitution. 
169 Alen ,  Treatise on Belgian Constitutional Law, 11. 
170  Gilissen ,  Le régime représentatif , 13. 
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itself by a personality distinct from the one of each of its members”. 171 In every case 
the  nation is deﬁ ned as a collective, abstract being transcending the concrete com-
munity of people. Their unanimity is deceiving however, for the cited  deﬁ nitions 
are of much later origin than the Constitution. Upon careful inspection, they cannot 
be traced back to the time of the Constitution’s  formation or to the years immedi-
ately following it. Constitutional  manuals and comments from the ﬁ rst decades after 
the  Constitution’s promulgation offer very diverging  interpretations  of the meaning 
of  article 25. 
 The oldest constitutional  manual , the  Manuel constitutionnel de la Belgique pub-
lished in April 1831, proclaimed:
 (...) cet  article établit la souveraineté du peuple que la République française proclama la 
première (…). La  légitimité  divine (la grâce de Dieu) des rois a disparu devant la  volonté , la 
 force et  l’union des peuples. 172 
 The  liberal university professor Antoine  Becart wrote in 1848:
 Le peuple est souverain, car il est l’objet de la souveraineté, mais s’il est la raison de tout ce 
qui se fait, il ne doit pas en être l’auteur lui-même: tout doit se faire pour lui mais non par 
lui. Donc la souveraineté ne réside pas réellement dans le peuple. 173 
 Jean  Stecher in his  Onpartydige volkshistorie des Belgische grondwet (“Impartial 
national history of the Belgian  Constitution ” ) of 1851 wrote:
 Het Bestuer bezit geene andere magte dan diegene, welke het Volk hem heeft toevertrouwd. 
Het Volk, als soeverein, is de oorsprong aller staetsmagten. In den maetschappelyken kring 
is de volksmagt boven alles – behalve boven God. 174 
 The same stance was taken in a  liberally inspired article published in the  Catholic 
 Journal  historique et  littéraire in 1852. It called the people  sovereign and deﬁ ned 
the  nation as:
 l’ensemble des membres dont la société se compose dans un Etat, c’est la réunion de tous 
les individus. Les individus meurent et sont remplacés par d’autres individus; la nation ne 
meurt pas, elle ne fait que se renouveler sans cesse. 175 
171  Wigny ,  Droit constitutionnel , 224. 
172  “(...) this  article established the sovereignty of the people, ﬁ rst proclaimed by the French 
Republic (…). The divine  legitimacy (the grace of God) of kings has disappeared before the will, 
the power and the union of the people”. N.N.,  Manuel constitutionnel de la Belgique , 40. 
173  “The people is sovereign because it is the object of sovereignty. But, despite being the reason of 
all that is done, it mustn’t itself be the author of it: all must be done for it but not by it. So  sover-
eignty doesn’t really reside in the people”.  Le Progrès belge no. 8, 23/07/1848. 
174  “The Government has no other powers that those it has been entrusted with by the people. The 
people, being the sovereign, is the source of all powers of state. In society, the power of the people 
is superior to everything except God”.  Stecher ,  Onpartydige volkshistorie des Belgische grondwet , 
15. 
175  “(…) the whole of all the members of which society is composed in a State; it is the reunion of 
all individuals. The individuals die and are replaced by other individuals; the nation doesn’t die, it 
perpetually rejuvenates itself”. Kersten, De la Constitution belge et de l’inﬂ uence qu’elle exerce 
sur l’esprit et les mœurs, 86. 
National Sovereignty in the Belgian Constitution of 1831. On the Meaning(s) of Article 25
128
 A somewhat less popular interpretation was defended by Hippolyte-Jérôme 
 Wyvekens , who in his  Notions élémentaires sur la Constitution belge et les lois 
politiques et  administratives (“Elementary notions on the Belgian Constitution and 
the political and administrative laws”) of 1854, wrote:
 Le gouvernement de la Belgique est constitutionnel, monarchique, représentatif. La souver-
aineté y est partagée entre le Roi, les représentants du peuple et les tribunaux, de la manière 
ﬁ xée par la Constitution. (…) Tous les pouvoirs émanent de la nation: l’exercice en est 
conféré au Roi, aux représentants du peuple et aux tribunaux. 176 
 In his  Manuel  des institutions constitutionnelles & administratives, des droits et 
des devoirs des belges of 1856 , the historian A.  Docquier  deﬁ ned  the  Nation as:
 (...) la totalité des hommes réunis en un même Etat (…). Ils forment un peuple lorsqu’ils ont 
la même origine ou la même langue. 177 
 Docquier continued by calling Belgium’s  Constitution a mixed government 
because it contained element of  democracy , monarchy and oligarchy. Later in the 
century, a very different sound was heard in the work of  Masson and  Wiliquet 
(1883):
 Le gouvernement de la Belgique est essentiellement démocratique, la Constitution le 
déclare nettement: tous les pouvoirs émanent de la nation (Const. 25). L’institution de la 
royauté elle-même, qui n’a conservé de la royauté d’autrefois que la majesté, le respect, la 
grandeur, est essentiellement populaire: c’est la nation qui a conféré l’autorité royale à 
Leopold de Saxe- Cobourg ; c’est par sa volonté solennellement proclamée en 1831, que 
cette autorité est héréditaire. 178 
 The cited works can hardly be said to be unanimous about the  meaning  of  nation 
and national  sovereignty . More importantly, many other constitutional  manuals and 
comments simply chose not to  deﬁ ne  these concepts at all, conﬁ ning themselves to 
repeating the vague formula of  article 25. Clearly, the nineteenth-century interpret-
ers of the Belgian  Constitution could not fall back on a generally accepted standard 
formula of national  sovereignty . The diversity of their writings disclaims the exis-
tence of a common theoretical concept of  nation shared by all the parties involved, 
176  “The Belgian government is constitutional, monarchical, representative.  Sovereignty is divided 
between the King, the representatives of the people and the tribunals, in the way ﬁ xed by the 
Constitution. (…) All the powers emanate from the nation: their exercise is attributed to the  King , 
the representative of the people and the tribunals”.  Wyvekens ,  Notions élémentaires sur la 
Constitution belge et les lois politiques et administratives, à l’usage des athénées, des écoles moy-
ennes et primaires et des aspirants aux emplois civils, 14–15. 
177  “(…) the totality of all men united in the same State (…). They constitute a people when they 
share the same origin and the same language”.  Docquier ,  Manuel des institutions constitution-
nelles & administratives, des droits et des devoirs des belges, ou principes du droit public et privé 
de la Belgique , 10. 
178  “The Belgian government is essentially democratic, the Constitution straightforwardly declares 
it: all the powers emanate from the Nation (Const. 25). The institution of royalty itself, which of 
the royalty of former times has only conserved its majesty, its respect, its grandeur, is essentially 
popular: it is the nation which has conferred royal authority to Leopold of Saxe- Coburg ; this 
authority is hereditary by its own will, solemnly proclaimed in 1831”.  Masson and  Wiliquet , 
 Manuel de droit constitutionnel , 39. 
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such as the one that is accepted by the leading constitutional  manuals  of today. The 
meaning of  article 25 has, instead, been a battleﬁ eld were authors of diverging polit-
ical persuasions met in an effort to ascertain who was entitled to membership of the 
 nation and, more importantly, to the exercise of political rights. 
 More is therefore at stake than simply a question of  deﬁ nitions . Henk de  Smaele 
has shown that the presently accepted  interpretation  of national  sovereignty in the 
Belgian  Constitution  was only developed  post factum . It goes back to Carré de 
 Malberg ’s classical distinction between national and popular  sovereignty in his 
 Contribution à la théorie générale de l’État (1920–22). De  Smaele follows the lead 
of Guillaume  Bacot in arguing against the validity of this distinction when applied 
to the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century. 179 Carré de 
 Malberg distinguished between two mutually exclusive conceptions of  sovereignty 
and traced them back to the works of  Rousseau and  Sieyès respectively. 180 Hence 
the well-known binary opposition still associated with these thinkers and concepts 
today: the  sovereignty of the concrete, physical people versus the sovereignty of an 
abstract, transcendent and ahistorical  nation ; political participation as a right versus 
a function; universal versus limited  suffrage ; the French  Constitution of 1793 versus 
the one of  1791 . 181 
 Bacot argues that Carré de  Malberg exaggerated the antithesis between the ideas 
of  Rousseau and  Sieyès . 182 According to him, the  meaning of the terms ‘nation’ and 
‘people’ was not at all ﬁ xed in this period. Both were often used as synonyms, which 
counters the importance usually attributed to the choice of words in the  Constitutions 
of 1791 and  1793 .  Rousseau ’s and  Sieyès ’ conceptions of  sovereignty are further-
more obscured by the internal paradoxes characterising the writings of both think-
ers. It is not the aim of this chapter to take a stance in the debate.  Bacot ’s observations 
do prove helpful however for coming to terms with the underdetermined character 
of national  sovereignty in the Belgian  Constitution . 
 What is striking about the constitutional  manuals  and commentaries cited above, 
is that many explicitly  identiﬁ ed  national  sovereignty with the sovereignty of the 
 people . In this they were consistent with the language employed in the National 
 Congress . When used in combination with ‘ sovereignty’ , the meaning of the terms 
‘ nation ’ and ‘people’ was interchangeable. Often both were alternately used by the 
same speaker, without entailing a change of meaning. Tellingly, in the ofﬁ cial Dutch 
version of the  Constitution , which had no legal force, ‘nation’ was translated as 
‘people’. Article  25  thus read: “Alle gezag komt van het volk” (“All the powers 
179  Bacot ,  Carré de Malberg ; De  Smaele ,  Omdat we uwe vrienden zijn. Roels too, despite his oth-
erwise faithful adherence to Carré de  Malberg , recognises that the latter exaggerated this distinc-
tion. Roels,  Le concept de représentation , 97. 
180  Bacot ,  Carré de Malberg , 7. 
181  Space does not allow to do justice to this complicated subject matter here. For more comprehen-
sive accounts, read: Baker, Constitution; Baker, Souveraineté; Brunet,  Vouloir pour la nation. Le 
concept de représentation dans la théorie de l’Etat ; Roels, Le concept de représentation; Deinet, 
The Development of the Constitutional Concepts in the First Part of 19th Century France. 
182  Bacot ,  Carré de Malberg. 
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emanate from the people”). 183 This use of language indicates that the creators of the 
Constitution of 1831 did not presuppose a theoretical difference between  national 
and popular sovereignty. In fact, they did not hesitate to call popular  sovereignty the 
guiding principle of the new constitutional system. When the priest Vander  Linden 
intervened against the proposed formulation of  article 25, his arguments were tell-
ingly directed against the  sovereignty of the people. 184 None of his colleagues con-
tradicted him. 
 Equally indicative is Etienne de  Gerlache ’s brochure  Essai sur le mouvement des 
partis en Belgique (“Essay on the movement of parties in Belgium”) of 1852, in 
which he fulminated against the popular  sovereignty enshrined in the Belgian 
 Constitution . De  Gerlache was not just anybody. He had been president of both the 
Constitutional  Commission and the National  Congress . His brochure was aimed 
against the new tendency of one party governments that put an end to almost two 
decades of unionism in Belgian politics. Most  Catholics deplored this evolution. 
They saw  parliamentarism as a threat to national unity and to the preservation of 
conservatism. 185 De  Gerlache ’s critique on popular  sovereignty was meant to dis-
credit  republicanism  in the French tradition:
 Le dogme de la souveraineté du  peuple , sur lequel reposent toutes nos théories constitution-
nelles, est gros de révolutions, inconciliable avec l’ordre et la paix, et avec tout Gouvernement 
régulier. C’est la plus détestable ﬂ atterie, le plus insigne mensonge que les démagogues 
aient jamais pu jeter aux masses”. 186 
 Although his feelings about it had visibly changed, De  Gerlache thus recognised 
popular  sovereignty as the basis of the Belgian institutions, just as he had done in 
the closing speech he delivered in the  Congress’s ﬁ nal session. In this speech, cited 
above, he insisted on the “voice of the people” as the Constitution’s ultimate source 
of  legitimacy . Marnix Beyen’s research into the use of political languages in 
 Parliament has furthermore shown that the reality of the principle of popular  sover-
eignty was generally accepted by the Belgian political parties in the nineteenth cen-
tury. In parliamentary debates, the concept was referred to in a positive way, lending 
legitimacy to the arguments it was associated to. 187 All of this is rather hard to 
183  Recueil des décrets du Congrès national de la Belgique et des arrêtés du pouvoir exécutif , 4th 
series, vol. 2, 135. Likewise, the French name of the Congress’s assembly hall,  Palais de la Nation 
(“Palace of the Nation”), was translated into Dutch as  Volkshuys (“House of the People”). 
184  Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 2, p. 14, 03/01/1831. 
185  De  Smaele , Politieke partijen in de Kamer, 147; Witte, De evolutie van de rol der partijen in het 
Belgische parlementaire regeringssysteem; Van den Wijngaert,  België en zijn koningen , 162. 
186  “The dogma of popular  sovereignty , on which all our constitutional theories rest, is full of revo-
lutions and irreconcilable with order and peace, and with every regular government. It is the most 
detestable, the most extraordinary lie ever thrown at the masses by the demagogues”. De  Gerlache , 
 Essai sur le mouvement des partis depuis 1830 jusqu’à ce jour, 65. In his history of the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands of 1859 he wrote that the Belgian Constitution, as opposed to the Dutch 
Fundamental  Law , was dominated by “the popular principle”. De  Gerlache ,  Histoire du Royaume 
des Pays-Bas depuis 1814 jusqu’en 1830 , 317. 
187  In the debates of the Dutch Estates  General , the opposite was true. Beyen and Te Velde, Modern 
Parliaments in the Low Countries . 
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 reconcile with the antithesis between  national and popular  sovereignty that is sup-
posed to have existed at the time of the Constitution’s creation. 
3.2  The Limitation of Political Participation 
 De  Smaele classiﬁ es the application of the absolute distinction between  popular and 
national  sovereignty to the  Constitution of 1831 as part of the ‘liberal myth’ by 
which liberal  politicians have, later in the nineteenth century, canonised their  rein-
terpretation  of  article 25. 188 As they grew conscious of the  radical potential of the 
formulation of the  article and its roots in the French republican  tradition , they theo-
rised a concept of national  sovereignty distinct from the idea of popular  sovereignty . 
In doing so, they relied heavily on the works of the French doctrinal  liberals , who 
had successfully developed a liberal interpretation of sovereignty that precluded 
popular political participation. 189 Liberty, according to this tradition, mainly con-
sisted of personal, administrative liberties without automatically supposing political 
rights. 190 
 The Belgian  Constitution was indeed famed for the ‘catalogue of liberties’ it 
contained and which were an important object of political propaganda fostered by 
the political elites. 191 Political rights were presented as a different thing altogether. 
Since the  nation was conceived of as impersonal and trans-historical, citizenship by 
no means automatically implied entitlement to political participation. 192 The func-
tion of representing the nation could safely be delegated to that part of the popula-
tion which by its socioeconomic situation was most suited to the task. The exact 
turning point in the constitutional  interpretations  is as yet unascertained, but it must 
in all likelihood be sought in the second half of the nineteenth century and possibly 
even towards the end of the century. 193 In any case, our analysis conﬁ rms that apply-
ing Carré de  Malberg ’s ‘liberal’ deﬁ nition of national  sovereignty to the  Constitution 
of 1831 amounts to an anachronistic reading of it. 
 In the National  Congress there was no trace of a theoretical distinction between 
both kinds of  sovereignty . However, counting few disciples of  Rousseau , the assem-
bly evidently shared  Sieyès ’ concern for the limitation of political participation. 
188  De  Smaele , Eclectisch en toch nieuw. 
189  Demoulin, Le courant libéral. 
190  Bacot ,  Carré de Malberg , 131; Brunet,  Vouloir pour la nation , 33; Collins,  Liberalism in 
Nineteenth-century Europe, 8; Jennings, Conceptions of England;  Marteel ,  Inventing the Belgian 
Revolution , 151. 
191  Huygebaert, Les quatres libertés cardinales. De iconologie van pers, onderwijs, vereniging en 
geloof in België, als uitdrukking van een populariserende grondwetscultus vanaf 1848; Janssens, 
 De Belgische natie viert. De Belgische nationale feesten, 1830–1914 ;  Marteel ,  Inventing the 
Belgian Revolution. 
192  Brunet,  Vouloir pour la nation , 31. 
193  De  Smaele , Eclectisch en toch nieuw, 413. 
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Along with  Montesquieu , the political scientist most cited in its midst was Benjamin 
 Constant , who himself was inﬂ uenced by  Sieyès . 194 His ‘English’ system, with its 
checks and balances, its limited  suffrage and pluralistic vision of politics, appealed 
greatly to the founders of the Belgian  Constitution. 195 Nevertheless,  Constant explic-
itly recognised that the French  Acte Additionnel of 1815 was based, and could only 
be based, on the  sovereignty of the people:
 Notre Constitution actuelle reconnaît formellement le principe de la  souveraineté du peu-
ple, c’est-à-dire la suprématie de la volonté  générale sur toute volonté particulière. 196 
 At the same time,  Constant agreed with  Sieyès that the people must by necessity 
delegate the exercise of  sovereignty to its representatives, so that direct  democracy 
was out of the question. 197 Also, both considered the restriction of  suffrage to a part 
of the population as an obvious necessity. 
 In other words, in the language of political theory of the day, and contrary to later 
interpretations, popular  sovereignty did not equate to universal  suffrage . The same 
is evidently true for the Belgian National  Congress . It seems logical to assume that 
the lack of  debate over the theoretical nature of  sovereignty in the Congress reﬂ ected, 
among other things, a tacit common opinion over its practical manifestation. After 
all,  article 25 merely indicated the nation as the  source of sovereignty, leaving open 
every option as to the modalities of political participation. It is true that all its talk 
of popular  sovereignty did not prevent the  Congress from carefully restricting polit-
ical rights. Not a single call for universal  suffrage was heard in the assembly room. 198 
Even delegates from the  republican left, like  Seron , explicitly rejected it. 199 Despite 
his former Jacobinism –  Seron had been secretary to Georges  Danton – he denounced 
the anarchy inherent in systems of ‘pure  democracy’ . 200 The conservative,  Catholic 
 newspapers  Courrier de la Meuse , protesting against the proclamation of popular 
 sovereignty in the Constitution, accused the  liberals of inconsistency:
 Nos confrères libéraux eux-mêmes n’exigent pas de notre part un aussi grand sacriﬁ ce; que 
disons-nous? Eux-mêmes reculent devant la démocratie pure, et personne d’entr’eux ne 
demande ni ne songe à établir le  suffrage universel. 201 
194  Idem, 31;  Gilissen , Die belgische Verfassung von 1831, 59;  Marteel , Polemieken over 
natievorming, 45. 
195  Gilissen ,  Le régime représentatif , 11; Van Velzen, De invloed van de theorie van Benjamin 
Constant op het regime van koning Willem I, 42. 
196  “Our present Constitution enshrines the principle of the sovereignty of the people, that is the 
supremacy of the collective will over any private wishes.”  Constant ,  Principes de politique, 13. 
197  Hoogers,  De verbeelding van het souvereine. Een onderzoek naar de theoretische grondslagen 
van politieke representatie , 143. 
198  Gilissen ,  Le régime représentatif , 90. 
199  Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie , 32. For Seron, see: Discailles, Seron 
(Pierre-Guillaume). 
200  Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 1, p. 198, 19/11/1830. 
201  “Even our liberal colleagues do not demand such a sacriﬁ ce from us. They themselves shrink 
from pure democracy, and not one of them either asks for nor thinks of establishing universal suf-
frage”.  Courrier de la Meuse no. 1, 01/01/1831. 
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 Much as the National  Congress recognised the people as the source of all  legiti-
mate authority, it had no intentions of letting the voice of the people dictate politics. 
The Congress was a socially conservative body. 202 Almost 75 % of the members 
belonged to the moneyed  bourgeoisie ; the remaining 25 % consisted of  nobles . The 
delegates held clear views on who was to represent the  nation and who was not. In 
the words of Joseph Forgeur:
 La meilleure des garanties à demander aux électeurs, c’est le payement d’un cens qui 
représente une fortune, une position sociale, aﬁ n qu’ils soient intéressés au bien-être et à la 
prospérité de la société. 203 
 The Constitutional  Commission had proposed to ﬁ x the property requirements 
for the franchise by ordinary law. Delegate Eugène  Defacqz , however, successfully 
proposed to include these requirements in the Constitution itself, so as to ensure 
their permanent character.  Defacqz even motivated his proposal by a concern to 
stave off calls for universal  suffrage in the future. By the introduction of direct  elec-
tion , the  nation would ﬁ nally have real representatives (as opposed to the indirectly 
elected members of the Estates  General under the Dutch regime). This did not mean 
however that the whole nation was called to the urns:
 Cependant la nation ne peut pas concourir directement et en entier à l’élection, car quelque 
beau, quelque séduisant que fût le spectacle d’un peuple concourant tout entier à l’élection 
de ses mandataires, nous savons malheureusement que cela est impossible. 204 
 Joseph  Forgeur agreed and warned his colleagues that the whole constitutional 
ediﬁ ce depended on immutable franchise requirements:
 (…) si vous n’avez pas dans la constitution une disposition qui ﬁ xe le cens électoral, comme 
c’est là-dessus que repose tout l’édiﬁ ce constitutionnel, il se pourrait que les législatures à 
venir, en le modiﬁ ant, renversassent tout votre ouvrage. 205 
 The resulting census  suffrage  requirements inscribed in the  Constitution were 
higher even than under the preceding Dutch regime. 206 Capacity  suffrage , which had 
been allowed for the  election of the  Congress itself, was abolished under the pre-
tense that it created privilege. Property requirements for the  Senate were so high 
that only a group of about 400 landowners, most of them  aristocrats , was 
eligible. 207 
202  De Lichtervelde,  Le Congrès National de 1830, 64;  Magits , De  Volksraad , 272. 
203  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 2, p. 29, 06/01/1831. 
204  “But the nation cannot in its entirety and directly participate in the election.  However beautiful, 
however seductive the spectacle of an entire people participating in the election of its representa-
tives may be, unfortunately we all know that it is impossible”. Huyttens,  Discussions, vol. 2, p. 28, 
06/01/1831. 
205  “(…) if you don’t include in the Constitution a stipulation ﬁ xing the census suffrage require-
ments, for on them rests the entire constitutional ediﬁ ce, future legislatures may, by changing it, 
overturn your entire work”. Huyttens,  Discussions, vol. 2, p. 29, 06/01/1831. 
206  Witte,  De constructie , 87. 
207  Stevens, Een belangrijke faze, 658. 
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 The  debates  of the  Congress do not allow to distill a distinct picture of the  nation 
as it existed in the minds of the delegates. This was all the more so because in ques-
tions of  sovereignty , the  nation and the people were treated as synonyms. If the 
nation was indeed conceived of as an entity different from the concrete people, that 
difference was not put into  words . What is clear, however, is that the idea of limited 
 suffrage was not considered to contradict the  sovereignty of the nation or the peo-
ple.  Suffrage had by necessity to be delegated to a portion of the population that 
could speak for the whole. In this sense, the principle of representation operated not 
only on the level of the Chamber of  Representatives , but also on that of the electors. 
The limitation of political participation was inherent to it, if only for pragmatic 
reasons. 
4  Reception 
4.1  The Contested Nature of Popular  Sovereignty 
 The  newspapers too, agreed on the meaning of  article 25. Regardless of their politi-
cal inclination, they interpreted it as the proclamation of popular  sovereignty . The 
anti-democratic, conservative  Courrier  de la  Meuse called it “(…) le principe de la 
souveraineté populaire absolue, lequel vient d’être nettement posé dans la 
constitution”. 208 The  radical  Le  Belge wrote:
 C’est dans le peuple que réside aujourd’hui la souveraineté. Cette souveraineté il l’exerce 
par ses représentans. Tout pouvoir, toute société qui voudrait décider nos grandes questions 
avant que le peuple n’ait eu le temps de se prononcer par l’organe de ses représentans, 
attenterait véritablement à la souveraineté nationale. 209 
 The  radical  Courrier de la Sambre  deﬁ ned  nation as:
 (...) une réunion d’hommes qui s’associent pour tout ce qui concerne la garantie des leurs 
intérêts privés et communs: de ce fait il découle nécessairement qu’à eux seuls appartient le 
droit de déterminer le mode le plus avantageux et le moins onéreux de parvenir à ce but. 210 
208  “The principle of absolute popular sovereignty, which has been clearly enshrined in the 
Constitution”.  Courrier de la Meuse no. 6, 07/01/1831. 
209  “Sovereignty nowadays resides in the people. It exercises this sovereignty by way of its repre-
sentatives. Every power, every society wishing to decide our great questions before the people has 
had time to pronounce via its representatives, would veritably be attacking national sovereignty”. 
 Le Belge no. 287, 14/10/1830. 
210  “A nation is nothing but a reunion of men who associate for everything which concerns the 
guarantee of their private and communal interests. It necessarily follows that the right to determine 
the most advantageous and least onerous way to obtain this goal, exclusively belongs to them”. 
 Courrier de la Sambre no. 189, 20/11/1830. The  Courrier de la Sambre was the mouthpiece of the 
liberal, constitutional opposition in Namur. Its editors were involved in the  radical  club  Réunion 
patriotique de Namur, the reports of which it published. See: Doyen,  Bibliographie namuroise, no. 
1764; Dulieu,  Namur 1830: une fringale de liberté ; Fivet,  Le Pays de Namur et la Révolution de 
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 The  liberal  Courrier des Pays-Bas  very literally identiﬁ ed the  nation with the 
people:
 Deux êtres qui n’étaient au fond que le même, sous deux modes différens d’existence: la 
nation, c’est-à-dire, tout le peuple; et la représentation nationale, c’est-à-dire, le peuple 
encore, mais agissant sous une forme convenue, pour se faciliter à lui-même l’exercice de 
sa  volonté . 211 
 Elsewhere the  newspaper jubilantly exclaimed:
 Qu’elle est noble, majestueuse, imposante, l’assemblée qui remplit l’auguste mission de 
fonder les institutions politiques d’un peuple libre! Son existence est la preuve la plus 
éclatante, la plus solennelle que la  souveraineté est dans le peuple, source et origine de tout 
pouvoir social. Qu’on vienne, en présence du congrès belge, nous persuader que les rois 
tiennent leur pouvoir directement de Dieu, et non pas de la volonté des peuples; qu’on 
vienne, en présence des débris de la couronne de Guillaume 1 er , nous dire que l’insurrection 
n’est pas l’acte extrême, mais légitime, de la souveraineté national outragée. 212 
 The  radical  L’Emancipation wrote that  sovereignty by necessity resided in the 
 nation and equated it with popular  sovereignty . 213 These ﬁ ndings are consistent with 
Els  Witte ’s research into the concept of  nation used in the period directly preceding 
the Belgian  Revolution . Via  discourse analysis methods she concluded that, although 
the term ‘nation’ was used more often in Belgian  newspapers than ‘people’, the 
former concept was positively associated with popular  sovereignty . 214 
1830: récit des événements ; Istace-Deprez, Le Courrier de la Sambre et la Révolution de 1830; 
Warnotte,  Etude sur la presse à Namur, 1794–1914 , 127. 
211  “Two beings which were essentially the same, under two different forms of existence: the 
nation, in other words the people; and the national representation, in other words, the people again, 
but acting in an agreed-upon form, to facilitate the exercise of its will”.  Courrier des Pays-Bas no. 
321, 17/11/1830. The  Courrier des Pays-Bas , based in Brussels, was one of the leading liberal and 
anticlerical  newspapers of the opposition against the regime of William I. Among its collaborators 
were prominent revolutionary leaders, several of whom rose to political power in the course of the 
Revolution: Louis de  Potter , Edouard  Ducpétiaux , Alexandre  Gendebien , Lucien  Jottrand , Jean-
Baptiste  Nothomb , Jean-François  Tielemans , Pierre Van  Meenen . On 1 January 1831, the title of 
the  newspaper changed into  Le Courrier .  Gilissen , Jean-Baptiste Nothomb, 6; Harsin,  Essai sur 
l’opinion publique, 29;  Witte , De Belgische radicalen, 16; Wouters, De Brusselse radikale pers, 
139. 
212  “How noble, how majestic, how imposing is the assembly, fulﬁ lling its august mission of found-
ing the political institutions of a free  people ! Its existence is the most solemn, the most brilliant 
proof of the sovereignty of the people, the source and origin of all social power. Who will, in the 
presence of the Belgian Congress, persuade us that kings hold their powers directly from God, and 
not from the will of peoples? Who will, in the presence of the debris of William I’s crown, tell us 
that insurrection is anything else than an extreme, but legitimate act of injured national sover-
eignty?”  Le Courrier no. 34, 03/02/1831. 
213  L’Emancipation no. 34, 23/11/1830.  L’Emancipation , based in Brussels, was a  radical  newspa-
per sponsored by French republican émigrés. Its contributors moved in the circles of radical think-
ers and revolutionaries such as  Buonarroti and De  Potter . Its principle editor was the republican 
delegate to the National Congress De  Robaulx . Kuypers,  Les égalitaires en Belgique. Buonarroti 
et ses sociétés secrètes d’après des documents inédits (1824–1836) ; Leconte, La Réunion centrale; 
Wouters, De Brusselse radikale pers, 141–142. 
214  Witte , Het natiebegrip. 
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 In the  newspapers  under investigation,  popular and national  sovereignty were 
treated as exact synonyms. The  newspapers systematically contrasted popular  sov-
ereignty with Old  Regime royal  sovereignty and divine  right . Whether they sup-
ported or rejected the principle, they presented its proclamation in Belgium in a 
historical perspective. The Belgian  Revolution was depicted as yet another phase in 
the ﬁ ght to the death which had been going on between both conceptions of  sover-
eignty since  1789 . The Belgians were said to have been inspired by the French July 
 Revolution , and to have taken it further by explicitly ruling out the last traces of 
monarchical  sovereignty : “Après ce principe, l’origine du pouvoir a été déplacé; elle 
n’a plus sa source dans la dynastie, mais dans la nation”. 215 
 However, the exact  meaning of popular  sovereignty was a source of controversy. 
The concept was explicitly discussed by journalists and led to sharp disputes 
between rival  newspapers . The  Courrier de la Meuse , while supporting the 
 Revolution , deplored the course taken by the Congress. While it recognised that the 
Revolution had been driven by the popular principle, it ﬁ ercely opposed turning it 
into a principle of government. The  newspaper considered it a dangerous concept, 
since it was unﬁ t to serve as the basis of a stable government:
 (…) si on veut combattre efﬁ cacement le despotisme populaire, le despotisme des partis, la 
tyrannie des tribuns et des anarchistes, non seulement il n’est pas nécessaire, d’admettre le 
principe de la  souveraineté du peuple , mais il est même très dangereux de l’admettre. (…) 
Malheur à nous, malheur au pays si notre nouvelle charte consacrait ce principe funeste! Ce 
serait le germe de sa mort, et par conséquent la cause de nouveaux bouleversements. Un 
gouvernement quelconque  fondé sur ce principe , n’a que la force brute pour se 
défendre. 216 
 What the  newspaper feared above all was the reign of the populace:
 (…) la  souveraineté des rues, souveraineté terrible, brusque, aveugle, sourde, cruelle et 
inexorable. (…) cette souveraineté monstrueuse qui parcourt les rues une torche à la main 
et qui ne vit que des désordres. 217 
 Following the  newspaper , the principle of popular  sovereignty was not only dan-
gerous, but also impracticable. It endorsed the  Journal des Flandres ’ description of 
the principle as “an absurd and chimeric supposition” since it considered it impos-
sible to fully realise. 218 In every human society, the exercise of power is by necessity 
delegated to a fraction of the population. Whichever political regime would be 
215  “By this principle, the origin of power has shifted, it is no longer in the dynasty but in the 
nation”.  Le Courrier no. 139, 19/05/1831. 
216  “(…) when wishing effectively to combat popular despotism, the despotism of parties, the tyr-
anny of tribunes and anarchists, it is not only unnecessary to admit the principle of popular sover-
eignty, but it is even very dangerous to do so. (…) Woe to us, woe to the country, should our new 
charter consecrate this fatal principle! It will be the seed of its death, and consequently the cause 
of new upheavals. Any government founded on this principle has nothing but brute force to defend 
itself”.  Courrier de la Meuse no. 262, 29/10/1830. 
217  “(….) the sovereignty of the streets, which is a terrible, sudden, blind, deaf, cruel and inexorable 
sovereignty. (…) this monstrous sovereignty which roams the streets torch in hand and which lives 
from disorders only”.  Courrier de la Meuse no. 169, 15/07/1831. 
218  Courrier de la Meuse no. 271, 10/11/1830. 
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instated by the  Constitution , it would never fully conform to the implications of 
 article 25. Therefore new revolts, followed by new failed attempts at popular gov-
ernments, were unavoidable:
 Vouloir que ces faits [the establishment of a new government] aient lieu véritablement en 
vertu de la souveraineté du peuple, c’est vouloir l’impossible, c’est vouloir ce qui ne s’est 
jamais vu. (…) c’est vouloir tous les jours une nouvelle révolution, c’est vouloir anéantir la 
société. (…) il faut, de toute nécessité, qu’il y ait un pouvoir souverain et ce pouvoir sou-
verain sera toujours, quoi qu’on fasse et quoi qu’on veuille, celui d’un ou de plusieurs 
individus, celui d’un ou de plusieurs corporations. 219 
 The  newspaper arrived at this conclusion by its identiﬁ cation of  sovereignty with 
the actual exercise of power. While it did approve of the idea that every power 
needed to rest on the consent of popular opinion, it rejected as impossible the idea 
of entrusting the exercise of power to the entire people. This would require a distri-
bution of power among all citizens, which meant its annihilation altogether. In every 
society, power is held by a limited group of people who command, while the rest of 
the population obeys. Only the holders of power can truly be called  sovereign : “(…) 
car toute souveraineté est absolue en ce sens qu’elle décide en dernier ressort et que 
personne ne résiste”. 220 In line with the  newspaper ’s  Catholic and reactionary back-
ground, it defended the view that sovereignty emanates not from the people but 
from  God and that it should be vested in the powerful hands of a hierarchically 
constituted government, preferably of a monarchical kind. The  newspaper went on 
to observe that even the National  Congress , by its own composition, contravened 
the popular  principle it so proudly proclaimed. Far from taking its  mandate from the 
hands of the entire people, it took it from the inﬁ nitesimal minority that had been 
allowed to vote. Without the introduction of universal  suffrage , to which even the 
 liberals objected, power could not be said to really emanate from the  nation :
 Chez nous, la souveraineté appartiendra vraisemblablement désormais à un vaste collège 
d’électeurs, qui sera composé peut-être d’environ 50,000 membres; ce sera  une quatre- 
vingtième de la nation ; et les 79 autres 80 mes , seront nécessairement sujets. (…) jamais on 
ne pourra, et quand on le pourrait, jamais on n’oserait y placer la nation toute entière. 221 
 Liberal and  radical  newspapers contested the  Courrier de le  Meuse ’s critique on 
the concept of popular sovereignty.  Le Vrai Patriote accused it of confusing the 
219  “To wish that the establishment of a new government really takes place by virtue of the sover-
eignty of the people is to wish the impossible, is to wish something that has never been seen before. 
(…) it is to wish a new revolution every day, to wish the annihilation of society. (…) it is necessary 
to have a sovereign power and this sovereign power will always, despite what one does or wishes 
for, belong to one or several individuals, to one or several groups”.  Courrier de la Meuse no. 269, 
07/11/1830. 
220  “(…) because all sovereignty is absolute in the sense that it decides in last resort and that no one 
resists”.  Courrier de la Meuse no. 59, 10/03/1831. 
221  “Henceforward, sovereignty will probably belong to a vast college of electors, which will be 
composed of around 50,000 members; it will consist of one eightieth part of the nation, and the 
other 79 parts will by necessity consist of subjects. (…) never will one be able to place sovereignty 
in the hands of the entire people, nor would one dare to do so, if one were able to”.  Courrier de la 
Meuse no. 269, 07/11/1830. 
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origin and the exercise of power. It considered popular  sovereignty to be self- evident 
because a government only exists where a people exists, and a people always has the 
power to change its mandataries. However, this by no means implied the establish-
ment of pure  democracy . 222 The  radical  Courrier de la Sambre  likewise pointed out 
that the origin and the exercise of power were two different things. It furthermore 
argued that the formulation of  article 4 of the  draft Constitution (“emanates from” 
instead of “resides in”) clearly  implied government by representation, not direct 
 democracy . 223 The  liberal  Courrier des Pays  Bas held a similar view:
 Nous convenons que la  souveraineté est absolue. Mais la souveraineté n’est pas dans les 
pouvoirs; elle est dans la nation. Les pouvoirs, loin d’être souverains, sont liés par la con-
stitution, qui est le véritable acte de la souveraineté. Ils peuvent, je le sais, franchir les 
limites  constitutionnelles , mais dans ce cas il y a rébellion des pouvoirs contre la souver-
aineté nationale. 224 
 The point was that, even if  sovereignty was undividable, a careful balance of 
 powers could be built upon its base. Also, universal  suffrage was absolutely out of 
the question. Nonetheless, popular  sovereignty was a reality, because the people 
was the source of all powers. 225 
 The  Courrier de la Meuse could not be convinced. Its fears were made worse by 
the composition of the National  Congress , which it judged to be all too  democratic . 
Already  sovereignty was fatally divided among so many electors and so many 
Congress delegates. Furthermore, the new  Constitution accorded a far too prepon-
derant position to the Chamber of  Representatives , at the expense of the  monarch . 
Instead of monarchy, the  Congress had created a pure  democracy in disguise:
 Notre congrès s’est, à la vérité, d’abord décidé pour une monarchie constitutionnelle; mais 
des résolutions postérieures ont complètement détruit cette décision; et maintenant il est 
évident que nous ne pouvons avoir qu’une vraie démocratie. Le roi ou le duc que nous 
aurons ne fera rien à l’affaire. 226 
222  Le Vrai Patriote no. 29, 10/11/1830.  Le Vrai Patriote, based in Brussels, was the short-lived 
successor of the defunct Orangists  newspaper  Gazette des Pays-Bas . It systematically criticised the 
Provisional  Government and favoured the return of the Nassau dynasty. Wouters, De Brusselse 
radikale pers, 140. 
223  Courrier de la Sambre no. 189, 20/11/1830. 
224  “We agree that sovereignty is absolute. But sovereignty is not in the powers, it is in the nation. 
The powers, far from being sovereign, are bound by the Constitution, which is the veritable act of 
sovereignty. It is true that they can transgress the constitutional limits, but in that case there is 
rebellion of the powers against the national sovereignty”.  Le Courrier no. 64, 05/03/1831. 
225  However, the  newspaper expected universal suffrage to become a reality in the future, as the 
people, by its progressive enlightenment, would develop the necessary capacities: “En effet, 
quelque avantage qu’on attende de l’abaissement du cens électoral, et de l’abolition intégrale du 
cens d’éligibilité, il est évident que les législateurs futures, sortant d’une société moralement et 
politiquement progressive, étendront successivement le cercle des capacités électorale et élective, 
et le jour viendra où les masses populaires seront assez éclairées pour concourir, sans aucune 
exception, et sans danger, à l’élection des députés”.  Le Courrier no. 118, 28/04/1831. 
226  “At ﬁ rst our Congress has, to be sure, decided for constitutional  monarchy ; but posterior resolu-
tions have completely destroyed this decision; and now it is evident that we can have nothing else 
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 The popular  principle was fated to cause the downfall of the  Constitution  which 
enshrined it:
 (…) nous ne pensons pas que ce que nous constitutions maintenant, soit pour l’avenir, c’est- 
à- dire, qu’il puisse durer. La charte à laquelle nous travaillons (nous croyons pouvoir le 
prédire) ne sera qu’une de ces constitutions éphémères dont le vieux et le nouveau monde 
ont vu des exemples par douzaines depuis une quarantaine d’années. 227 
 The controversy goes to show that, despite a general understanding that national 
 sovereignty , as enshrined in  article 25, was synonymous with popular  sovereignty , a 
widely shared  deﬁ nition of it was not at hand. All parties agreed that the new prin-
ciple implied that all powers derived from below. They differed on the questions of 
the division of powers and the extent of political participation. 
4.2  Legal Order, Legitimate Representation and Political 
Participation 
 The question of who was entitled to represent the  nation was a cause for controversy 
from the very beginning. It directly concerned the  legitimacy of the  Revolution and 
the source of  sovereignty . At ﬁ rst, the Belgian opposition had taken recourse to the 
Fundamental  Law for legitimising its claims. The years 1827-‘29 were marked by 
systematic attacks on the Dutch government, based on the real or supposed provi-
sions of the  Constitution of 1815. 228 It earned the Belgian opposition the nickname 
‘constitutionals’, as opposed to the ‘ministerials’ siding with the government. 229 The 
French  newspaper  Le Constitutionnel commented: “L’insurrection est décidemment 
nationale et constitutionnelle”. 230 The  Courrier des Pays-Bas encouraged the 
Belgian delegates to the Estates  General to persist in their “legal resistance” against 
“the  violations  of the Fundamental  Law ” and against the “anti-constitutional proj-
ects of the ministers”. 231 It conﬁ rmed that what the opposition desired was respect 
for the will of the Fundamental  Law , and added: “Nous le répétons, nous ne sommes 
ni en révolution, ni en insurrection”. 232 
but a pure democracy. Our future King or Duke will change nothing to the fact”.  Courrier de la 
Meuse no. 6, 07/01/1831. 
227  “(…) we do not think that the thing we are currently constituting, will be the future, in other 
words, that it will last. The charter we are working on (we believe we can predict) will be but one 
of these ephemeral constitutions of which the old and the new world have seen scores of examples 
in the last forty years or so”.  Courrier de la Meuse no. 8, 09/01/1831. 
228  Cordewiener,  Etude de la presse liégeoise , 65; Harsin,  Essai sur l’opinion publique. 
229  Marteel , Polemieken over natievorming. 
230  “The insurrection is deﬁ nitely national and constitutional”. Quoted in:  Courrier de la Sambre 
no. 140, 13/09/1830. 
231  Courrier des Pays-Bas no. 260, 17/09/1830. 
232  “We repeat that we are neither waging a revolution nor an insurrection”.  Courrier des Pays-Bas 
no. 244, 01/09/1830. 
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 Soon afterwards, however, a new  legitimation was needed. Violent actions in the 
streets of Brussels led to the creation of new forms of authority alongside the ofﬁ cial 
ones. As the Belgian protests started to resemble a proper rebellion, the government 
denounced them as illegal. In his Royal Message of 5 September, King  William 
announced that a debate over the grievances of the Belgian opposition could only be 
opened on the condition of the latter’s “return into the legal order”. 233 The opposi-
tion replied that the legal order, as it was meant by William, was tyrannical because 
it harmed the rights of the Belgian  Nation . The  Courrier des Pays-Bas 
commented:
 Nous ne sommes plus dans l’ordre légal tel que le ministère Van  Maanen l’avait organisé, 
parce que cet ordre légal était tyrannique pour nous, et ce prétendu ordre légal n’étant autre 
chose que l’oppression organisée et couverte d’un vernis de légalité, c’est lui qu’il faut 
modiﬁ er et corriger. 234 
 It contested the legality of the existing order on account of its tyrannical charac-
ter and of the harm it caused to the Belgian  Nation : “Cet ordre, c’est l’oppression de 
le Belgique systématiquement organisée avec un faux semblant de légalité”. 235  Le 
Vrai  Patriote maintained that a people was free to choose a new leader when the 
social  contract was being  violated . 236 As the opposition left the legal order behind, 
the rights of the nation were increasingly being named as the only  legitimate source 
of authority. The  Courrier de la Sambre  wrote:
 Et qu’on ne dise pas qu’il faut le consentement des états-généraux; nous sommes aujourd’hui 
en dehors de l’ordre légal; toute mesure est légale en ce moment dès qu’elle a pour base 
l’assentiment de la nation. 237 
 Towards the end of September, Dutch troops violently clashed with an impro-
vised army of insurrectionists on the streets of Brussels, sparking general rebellion 
against the Dutch government. The killing of Belgian citizens by the Dutch troops 
was presented as a ﬁ nal attack on the Belgian  Nation by which the Dutch govern-
ment forfeited its remaining claims to  legitimate authority.  Le Courrier  proclaimed 
233  Courrier des Pays-Bas no. 252, 09/09/1830. 
234  “We are no longer under the legal order organised by the Minister Van Maanen, because that 
legal order was tyrannical for us. Since it is nothing but organised oppression covered with a var-
nish of legality, this supposed legal order must be modiﬁ ed and changed”.  Courrier des Pays-Bas 
no. 256, 13/09/1830. Cornelis Felix van  Maanen (1769–1846) was  William I’s Minister of Justice. 
As the driving force behind the press trials directed against prominent opposition members in the 
years preceding the Belgian Revolution, and as a staunch supporter of William’s autocratic style of 
government, he became the personiﬁ cation of the ‘ministerial’ regime abhorred by the Belgian 
opposition. Van Sas, Het politiek bestel onder koning Willem I; Vermeersch, Willem I en de pers 
in de Zuidelijke Nederlanden, 1814–1830. 
235  “This order is the systematically organised oppression of Belgium with a fake semblance of 
legality”.  Courrier des Pays-Bas no. 260, 17/09/1830. 
236  Le Vrai Patriote no. 29, 10/11/1830. 
237  “Don’t tell us that we need the consent of the Estates  General . We are now outside of the legal 
order. Presently, every measure is legal as soon as it is founded on the approval of the nation”. 
 Courrier de la Sambre no. 137, 09/09/1830. 
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that the only  legitimate source of authority in the contemporary world was the peo-
ple’s right to self-determination:
 Aujourd’hui ce n’est pas le fait antérieur, ni les convenances de tel souverain qui peuvent 
autoriser sans leur consentement respectif la réunion de deux peuples en une seule famille 
politique. Le principe qui a triomphé en septembre est l’association consentie. (…) Le 
principe de l’association consentie, est aujourd’hui tellement inhérent au principe du gou-
vernement populaire, que le règne de la liberté ne pourra pas autrement s’établir en Europe, 
qu’en laissant à chaque peuple la faculté de s’unir à l’association politique qui est le plus 
conforme à ses vœux. 238 
 As Dutch authority was eroded, the Provisional  Government ﬁ lled the void. 
From that moment on, respect for the old legal order needn’t concern the Belgians 
any more, the  newspapers  agreed.
 “(…) cette question a été résolue dans les journées de 23, 24, 25 et 26 septembre; c’est cette 
solution qu’il fallait solennellement faire connaître; c’est le seul titre du gouvernement 
provisoire; il y puise sa légitimité”. 239 
“La guerre a prononcé, c’est la légitimité de son mandat improvisé au milieu de la lutte”. 240 
“Secondons de tous nos efforts l’autorité naissante, autorité éminemment populaire et qui 
est avoué par la nation”. 241 
 The Provisional  Government ’s  mandate was considered  legitimate by its acting in 
the interest of the  nation . 242 The latter was said to have endorsed it by tacit 
agreement:
 “La nation qui ne pouvait agir par elle-même, laissait agir en son nom le gouvernement 
provisoire, tant que les circonstances le rendaient indispensable”. 243 
“Il arrive parfois que des hommes montent au pouvoir vacant sans élection directe et que le 
peuple les souffre sans répugnance manifeste. Le peuple les élit en ne le renversant pas. 
C’est la position de notre gouvernement provisoire. 244 
238  “Nowadays neither prior facts nor the liking of such or such sovereign can authorise, without 
their respective consents, the reunion of two peoples into one political family. The principle which 
has triumphed in September is that of consented association. (…) The principle of consented asso-
ciation is today so inherent to popular government that the reign of liberty cannot establish itself 
in Europe but by leaving each people the faculty to unite with the political association most con-
forming to its wishes”.  Le Courrier no. 173, 22/06/1831. 
239  “(…) this question has been answered during the days of 23, 24, 25 and 26 September; this solu-
tion had to be solemnly announced; it is the only title of the Provisional  Government ; it is the 
source of its  legitimacy ”.  Courrier des Pays-Bas no. 278, 05/10/1830. 
240  “War has pronounced, it is the  legitimacy of its  mandate improvised in the middle of the battle”. 
 Courrier des Pays-Bas no. 274, 01/10/1830. 
241  “Let us support with all our efforts the nascent authority. This eminently popular authority is 
avowed by the nation”.  Courrier de la Sambre no. 162, 11/10/1830. 
242  Gilissen,  Le régime représentatif , 80. 
243  “Not being able to act by itself, the nation let the Provisional  Government act in its name as long 
as the circumstances rendered it indispensable”.  Courrier des Pays-Bas no. 321, 17/11/1830. 
244  “It sometimes happens that men ascend to the vacant power without being directly elected and 
that the people tolerates them without manifest repugnance. The people elects them by not over-
throwing them. Such is the position of our present government”.  Le Vrai Patriote no. 29, 
10/11/1830. 
National Sovereignty in the Belgian Constitution of 1831. On the Meaning(s) of Article 25
142
 The Provisional  Government therefore  legitimately represented the nation until 
such time as the  nation was in a position to designate the representatives of its own 
choice:
 Le gouvernement  provisoire , comme seule représentation nationale d’alors, avait au nom de 
la nation et comme si c’eût été cette nation elle-même qui agissait, déterminé, pour une 
époque postérieure, une autre forme de représentation nationale. Cette nouvelle forme réali-
sée, la première était anéantie, à moins qu’on ne soutînt qu’il fût convenable que la nation 
fût représentée à la fois de deux manières. 245 
 The  newspapers thus endorsed De  Potter ’s  justiﬁ cation of the Provisional 
 Government ’s actions presented in the opening session of the National  Congress . 
The argument was essential for the  legitimacy of the  mandate  of the  Congress itself. 
For if the Provisional  Government hadn’t legitimately represented the  nation , how 
could a body that had been single-handedly convened by its initiative be said to do 
so? At stake was the very origin of  sovereignty . In general, few observers outright 
rejected the  legitimation provided by the Provisional  Government for taking power. 
However, this sensitive question did now and then surface in the  press in the follow-
ing months, in particular when a  newspaper didn’t agree with the line taken by the 
Government or the Congress. 
 In its crusade against the principle of popular  sovereignty , the  Courrier de la 
Meuse  didn’t hesitate to qualify the Provisional  Government ’s claim to represent the 
people as pure ﬁ ction:
 Deux cent hommes, choisis par quelques milliers de notables du pays, vont se réunir à 
Bruxelles; ils y vont exercer les droits de la souveraineté; de qui les tiennent-ils, ces droits? 
De nous électeurs; et nous électeurs, de qui tenons-nous les nôtres? Du gouvernement pro-
visoire; et le gouvernement provisoire ne tient les siens de personne, il les tient de 
lui-même. 246 
 The Provisional  Government could not by right claim to represent the  nation . 
Neither could the  Congress , since, as the Fundamental  Law had been abolished, it 
had been convened in the absence of a valid electoral law:
 La nécessité veut que les hommes qui vont décider de notre avenir, ne doivent leur droit de 
voter qu’à une simple ordonnance, émanée d’un pouvoir provisoire qui ne tient son mandat 
que de lui-même: nouvelle preuve de l’impossibilité d’appliquer au corps social le principe 
de la souveraineté du peuple. 247 
245  “Being the sole representative of the nation at that moment, the Provisional  Government had in 
the name of the nation, and as if through the action of the nation itself, determined for a later 
moment another form of national representation. As soon as that new form was realised, the ﬁ rst 
one was nulliﬁ ed, unless one had found it suitable for the nation to be represented in two ways at 
the same time”.  Courrier des Pays-Bas no. 321, 17/11/1830. 
246  “Two hundred men, chosen by a few thousand of the country’s notables, will unite in Brussels; 
there they will exercise the sovereign rights. But from whom do they take these rights? From us, 
the electors. But from whom do we, electors, take ours rights? From the Provisional  Government . 
And the Provisional Government doesn’t take them from anyone, it takes them from itself”. 
 Courrier de la Meuse no. 269, 07/11/1830. 
247  “By way of necessity, the men who are to decide over our future owe their right to vote to a 
simple ordinance, issued by a provisional power which took its  mandate  from itself only: another 
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 Whereas the  newspaper approved of the Provisional  Government ’s actions, it 
denied that its  mandate rested on popular or national  sovereignty . 
 Most  newspapers didn’t contest the Provisional  Government ’s popular  mandate 
though, and praised its members for their competent government. They did however 
show a measure of distrust towards this non-elected authority. The  mandate  of the 
Constitutional  Commission in particular was a matter of debate in the  press , just as 
it was in the  Congress .  Le Belge published a letter by Alphonse  Dujardin , who con-
tested the Commission’s right to present a  draft Constitution to the Congress, since 
only the latter represented the people:
 (…) car il n’appartient à aucun pouvoir, ni fraction de pouvoir, non seulement d’octroyer ou 
de concéder, mais même de proposer une constitution. 248 
 Whereas the Provisional  Government was considered to  legitimately exercise 
public authority in anticipation of the installation of a proper national representa-
tion, it was felt that drawing up a new Constitution, even when it was only a  draft 
version, should not be within its competence. To a great extent these critiques were 
motivated by a rejection of the conservative slant of the  draft Constitution, which 
was generally poorly received in the press. 249 
 The most  radical protest was indeed heard on the left side of the ideological 
spectrum. The conservative  Courrier de la Meuse signalled that many  democrats 
and  republicans had been disappointed by the property requirements for  suffrage of 
the constituent  elections :
 Le mécontentement fut même si grand que beaucoup d’entre ces derniers annoncèrent très- 
clairement qu’ils ne se croiraient pas liés par les décisions du congrès. 250 
 Since it had been elected by less than 1 % of the population, the  Congress was 
not considered by these people to truly represent the  nation . The  democratic  news-
paper  L’Emancipation blamed the Provisional  Government for its ‘unlawful’ intro-
duction of census  suffrage :
 Nous disions au gouvernement qu’il se fît dictateur pour le bien du pays. Il a abusé de ses 
pouvoirs pour dépouiller de leurs droits les neuf dixièmes de la nation. Il s’est privé de tous 
ceux-là surtout qui faisaient sa force et son appui. 251 
proof of the impossibility to apply to the social body the principle of popular sovereignty”. 
 Courrier de la Meuse no. 252, 17/10/1830. 
248  “(…) for it does not belong to any power, nor to any fraction of a power, not only to grant or to 
concede, but even to propose a Constitution”.  Le Belge no. 304, 31/10/1830. Dujardin further 
expounded his opinion in a separately published brochure:  Dujardin ,  La Belgique au 16 octobre 
1831 . See also:  Magits ,  De Volksraad , 354. 
249  Magits ,  De Volksraad , 354;  Nothomb ,  Essai , 78. 
250  “So discontented were they, that many of them publicly announced their conviction that they 
were not bound by the decisions of the Congress”.  Courrier de la Meuse no. 40, 16/02/1831. 
251  “We told the government to become dictatorial for the well-being of the country. It has abused 
its powers so as to rob nine tenths of the nation of its powers. It has especially discarded power 
from those who constituted its power and its support”.  L’Emancipation no. 15, 03/11/1830. 
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 The  Courrier de la Sambre  likewise protested against the ‘arbitrary’ and ‘absurd’ 
limitation of  suffrage introduced by the Provisional  Government , which in its view 
completely undermined the principle of national  sovereignty :
 Le congrès tient son mandat d’une petite fraction de la nation belge, mais cette petite frac-
tion ne tient le sien que du percepteur des contributions . 252 
 Very few  radicals  were elected to the  Congress , since most of their sympathisers 
did not have the vote. 253 The few of them that were involved in the Provisional 
 Government and the  Congress quickly realised that they belonged to an inﬁ nitesi-
mal minority. 254 Jean-François  Tielemans quit the Constitutional  Commission when 
his colleagues decided to maintain the monarchy instead of establishing a  repub-
lic . 255 His friend and mentor Louis de  Potter stepped down from the Provisional 
 Government soon after the National  Congress ’s ﬁ rst session. 256 He too found the 
 draft Constitution a far too conservative piece of work and slightingly commented: 
“Ce n’était pas la peine de verser tant de sang pour si peu de chose”. 257 Since his 
 republican and  democratic programme had no chance of being endorsed by those 
who had now come to power, he shifted his actions to other terrains. 
 Disappointment over the  suffrage requirements indeed prompted some  radicals 
 to dispute the  Congress’s aptitude to represent the  nation . 258 Typical examples of 
this line of reasoning are  Grenier ’s calling into question the  mandate  of the  Congress 
and  Toussaint’s threat of a new popular revolution against the institution of a  Senate 
(both cited above).  Radicals took their cue from  Rousseau in arguing that the  sover-
eignty needed to be shared by the whole nation, which they identiﬁ ed as the physi-
cal people. They typically accused the government of depriving those who didn’t 
have the vote of their citizenship, as in a letter to the  Courrier  de la  Sambre signed 
by “un ex-citoyen à ﬂ . 49,99 ¾” (“an ex-citizen” who fell short of the  suffrage 
requirements by less than one cent). 259 
252  “The Congress takes its  mandate from a small fraction of the Belgian nation, but that small frac-
tion takes its own from the tax collector only”.  Courrier de la Sambre no. 202, 26/11/1830. 
253  With Els  Witte , we count as  radicals  those who contested the social inequality upon which the 
power position of the  bourgeoisie was based. This heterogeneous group of people shared the com-
mon goal of striving for the introduction of democratic and social reforms, usually via parliamen-
tary action.  Witte ,  Politieke machtsstrijd , 349;  Witte , De Belgische radicalen;  Witte ,  De constructie 
van België , 109. For the radical  press , which was often of a republican persuasion, see: Vermeersch, 
De structuur van de Belgische pers, 1830–1848, 104–115 and Wouters, De Brusselse radikale pers. 
254  Witte , De Belgische radicalen, 16. 
255  Hymans,  Le Congrès national , 19; Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie , 35. For 
 Tielemans , see: Freson, J.F. Tielemans; Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie , 18–19. 
256  Witte ,  De constructie , 88. 
257  “There was no point in spilling so much blood for so little result”.  Nothomb ,  Essai , 98; Van den 
Steene,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie , 41. 
258  In the spring of 1831 the  radicals’  dissatisfaction culminated in a failed attempt at a democratic 
coup.  Witte , De Belgische radicalen, 17. 
259  Courrier de la Sambre no. 205, 29/11/1830. 
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 The  radical  club  Réunion centrale used the questionable representativeness of 
the Congress as an argument against the ‘reactionary’  draft Constitution of the 
 Commission , formally petitioning the Provisional  Government to substitute it with 
a new,  republican alternative:
 L’ordonnance électorale dictée par le même esprit, enlève à 9/10 des citoyens leurs droits 
civiques. Quand l’état se reconstitue, tout citoyen a le droit de concourir à la formation de 
la  constitution qui doit le régir. Si on lui refuse ce droit, il conserve celui de protester contre 
l’œuvre anti-populaire qu’une représentation manquée pourrait produire, ainsi que le droit 
d’exprimer ses vœux, et de déclarer ses volontés par une autre voie que celle dont il est 
 illégalement exclu. Ce droit, nous l’exerçons au nom du peuple, en vous faisant connaître 
qu’il regarde le projet de constitution comme indigne d’un peuple libre. 260 
 It predicted a new outbreak of revolutionary violence if the ‘tyrannical’  draft 
Constitution was put into force. The  Courrier  de la  Sambre put into doubt the man-
date of the  Congress on the same grounds. It did so in response to the  Congress’s 
decision in favour of a monarchical form of  state , whereas the majority of the peo-
ple, according to the  newspaper , desired a  republic :
 Tous les doutes devraient disparaître si les élections des membres du congrès eussent été 
plus populaires, si les neuf-dixièmes de la nation n’eussent pas été arbitrairement destitués 
de l’exercice de leurs droits politiques par le gouvernement provisoire. Mais, à la manière 
dont les choses ont été, il est bien permis à l’immense majorité du peuple de protester contre 
la décision de la  majorité d’une chambre qui ne représente que la  minorité. 261 
 L’Emancipation too, ﬁ ercely attacked both the Constitutional  Commission and 
the National  Congress , neither of which, in its view, really represented the people. 
After vividly describing the Belgian  Revolution as the triumph of the people over 
the despotism of monarchs, it expressed its indignation over this fact:
 (…) que quelques hommes arriérés, stationnaires, d’une société qui n’est plus, que d’autres 
trop timides, trop faibles, trop craintifs pour être du siècle auquel ils appartiennent par leur 
âge, osent sans mandat vous présenter une constitution qui, sous d’autres formes, n’est que 
la loi  fondamentale que vous avait imposée Guillaume  le sanguinaire . (…) Ce congrès, 
nous l’appellerons impopulaire, déplorable, parce qu’il ne peut être l’expression du vœu 
général; le gouvernement provisoire ayant limité le droit électoral, droit que nul pouvoir, 
nulle puissance ne peut limiter, qui est inhérent au caractère du citoyen, et que dans une 
260  “The same spirit dictated the electoral regulation, which deprives 9/10 of the citizens of their 
civic rights. When a state is being reconstructed, every citizen has the right to contribute to the 
formation of the  Constitution  which is going to govern him. If he is being denied this right, he 
preserves the right to protest against the anti-popular piece of work which a failed representation 
may produce, as well as the right to express his wishes and to declare his will by another means 
than the one from which he has illegally been excluded. We exercise this right in the name of the 
people when we let you know that we consider the  draft Constitution unworthy of a free people”. 
 L’Emancipation no. 20, 09/11/1830; National Archives of Belgium, Gouv. Prov. III, no. 412. See 
also: Leconte, La Réunion Centrale, 969. 
261  “All doubts should have disappeared, if the  elections of the members of the Congress had been 
more popular, if nine tenths of the nation had not arbitrarily been deprived of the exercise of their 
political rights by the Provisional  Government . But given the turn things have taken, the great 
majority of the people has every right to protest against the decision of the majority of a chamber 
which represents only a minority”.  Courrier de la Sambre no. 202, 26/11/1830. 
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société qui se reconstitue on a encore moins le droit de limiter, si on veut que les lois adop-
tées par le congrès soient obligatoires pour tous. 262 
 It, too, predicted the outbreak of a new revolution and more bloodshed in order 
to establish a Constitution based on the true principles of the Belgian  Revolution . 
5  Conclusions 
 Since the end of the nineteenth century it is a commonplace in Belgian constitu-
tional  manuals to remark that whereas the terms of the Constitution are ﬁ xed, their 
meaning changes over time. Due to its longevity, the Belgian  Constitution has 
shored up a succession of political systems, each of which has been shaped by the 
needs and expectations of an evolving society. Although the political mechanism 
has for a long time been made up of the same ﬁ xed set of components, the mutual 
relations between the components and the impact of each component on the whole 
have undergone remarkable evolutions. Some of these changes have been for-
malised via constitutional  revisions (the ﬁ rst two of which, made in 1893 and 1921, 
mainly concerned electoral  law ), but considerable parts of the 1831  Constitution 
survive until this day, although their meaning for political practice has changed 
dramatically. 263 Notable examples concern the stipulations on the role of the  mon-
arch in the legislative process, such as the royal  veto and the royal right to dissolve 
the chambers, his right to appoint and dismiss the ministers and his function as 
commander-in-chief of the army. 
 Article 25’s chances for survival were no doubt enhanced by its concise and 
underdetermined formulation. 264 Under its ﬂ ag several diverse  systems have fared: 
census  suffrage with an electorate of less than 1 % of the population (1831), univer-
sal plural manhood suffrage (1893), universal manhood suffrage (1919) and univer-
sal suffrage for all citizens of over 18 years of age (1948). Despite the historical 
consciousness displayed by some authors of constitutional  manuals , debate over the 
exact meaning of national  sovereignty as intended by the creators of the Constitution 
in 1830–1831 has been scarce. Moreover, diverse ideological  readings have post 
factum been projected on the term. This chapter has attempted to restore  article 25 
to its proper historical context within the  genesis of the Belgian Constitution. 
262  “(…) that some retarded, stationary men, stemming from a society which no longer exists, and 
others who are too timid, too weak, too faint-hearted to be of the century to which they by their age 
belong, dare, without a  mandate , to present to you a Constitution which is nothing other than the 
Fundamental Law, imposed unto you by William  the Bloody , under a new form. (…) We call this 
Congress unpopular and deplorable because it cannot be the expression of the general  will , since 
the Provisional  Government has limited the electoral rights. No force or power can limit these 
rights, which are inherent to the character of the citizen, and which in a society which is recon-
structing itself must be even less limited, if one wishes the laws adopted by the Congress to be 
obligatory for all”.  L’Emancipation no. 14, 04/11/1830. 
263  Gilissen ,  Le régime représentatif , 18. 
264  Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie , 64. 
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 It can come as no surprise that a diversity of political  languages was present in 
Belgium’s constituent  assembly . Terms and concepts associated with thinkers like 
 Montesquieu ,  Constant ,  Rousseau or De  Lamennais , carrying diverging theoretical 
and ideological implications, can be distinguished. The language used by a minority 
of  republican  delegates, like  Seron and De  Robaulx , probably stands out most for its 
consistency. 265 However, it would be a mistake to assume that impenetrable barriers 
separated these languages. In fact, many terms and concepts, although often central 
to the debates, lacked a generally accepted  deﬁ nition . The confusion over words like 
 republic ,  democracy  and monarchy was at times complete. Different terms were 
used for the same concept, whereas different concepts could hide under the same 
term. The interpenetrability of the languages used in the  Congress was reﬂ ected by 
the sometimes very slight minorities by which key elements of the new state system, 
like the  Senate, were decided upon. 266 It must not be forgotten that the confection of 
the Belgian  Constitution was an ad hoc affair. While the Constitutional  Commission 
concluded its work on the  draft Constitution in 6–10 days, the  Congress needed a 
little over 2 months for debating and approving the ﬁ nal  Constitution . 267 Although 
around half of the delegates held a degree in law, they were for the most part  homi-
nes novi , without extensive prior experience with the workings of a legislative 
assembly, let alone a  constituent  one. 268 
 In this context it may be easier to understand why a central concept like the 
nation did not have an unambiguous  meaning , not even for the creators of the 
Constitution. The  debates  in the National  Congress clearly show that for many del-
egates ‘ nation’ and ‘people’ meant the same thing. Indeed, ‘sovereignty of the  peo-
ple’ was freely used as a synonym for ‘national  sovereignty’ . It can therefore not be 
maintained that the choice for the term ‘nation’ in  article 25 mirrors a speciﬁ c 
political- theoretical position. The  interpretation of the term was not fought out in 
bouts of abstract theorisation (even  article 25 was passed with very little discussion) 
but in very practical  debates  over the division of and access to power, most notably 
in the questions of census  suffrage , the powers of the  monarch and bicameralism. 269 
As a result, the state system organised by the Belgian  Constitution bears traces of 
different political-theoretical traditions, just as the constitutional  text  itself is a 
mosaic of articles borrowed from existing examples. 270 
 What can be ascertained beyond a doubt is that  article 25 was meant to enshrine 
a system where sovereignty came from below. Since the  mandate  of the  Congress 
265  De  Smaele , Eclectisch en toch nieuw. 
266  Gilissen and Magits, Les déclarations de droits dans l’historiographie du droit des provinces 
belges , 7. 
267  Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 1–2;  Magits ,  De Volksraad , 346; Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische 
grondwetscommissie , 39. 
268  De Lichtervelde, Introduction;  Magits ,  De Volksraad , 261. 
269  Descamps,  La mosaïque , 51; Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie , 37. 
270  Descamps,  La mosaïque. De Smaele highlights the resulting eclecticism of the Constitution, 
calling it a mixture of elements from the liberal and republican traditions. De  Smaele , Eclectisch 
en toch nieuw. 
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originated in a  revolt directed against irresponsible royal government, its members 
were logically concerned with safely vesting the key to state power in the hands of 
the  nation . This is made abundantly clear by the stipulations on ministerial  respon-
sibility (with  countersignature and royal  inviolability ), the limitation imposed on 
royal power, the yearly vote of the  budget and the  election of both  chambers . At the 
same time, the Congress was a socially conservative body elected by and composed 
of members of the  aristocracy and the upper  bourgeoisie . 271 It was as anxious to 
prevent the tyranny of the masses as royal despotism. National or popular  sover-
eignty was therefore perfectly compatible, in its view, with the limitation of  suffrage 
to the propertied classes. 
 This is not to say that the  Congress’s interpretation of national  sovereignty went 
uncontested. In the  press , the meaning of  article 25 was a cause of heated and some-
times bitter  debate . Whereas all  newspapers agreed that it enshrined popular  sover-
eignty ,  opinions diverged over the desirability and the possibility of constructing a 
functional political system on its basis, and on the conditions for doing so. Whereas 
moderate  liberal  and  Catholic  journals generally backed the interpretation of the 
 Congress in these matters, their counterparts on the far right and the far left loudly 
protested against it. For them, national or popular  sovereignty was indissolubly 
linked to universal  suffrage . Its realisation was a source of apprehension for some, 
a source of frustrated craving for others. Both camps, being underrepresented in the 
 Congress , reacted by calling into question the  legitimacy of the constituent  assem-
bly . Their efforts remained without effect, however, just as their bleak auspices of 
imminent state collapse or popular revolution remained unfulﬁ lled. 
6  Summaries (French & Dutch) 
6.1  La souveraineté de la Nation dans la Constitution belge 
de 1831. Sur les signifi cations de l’article 25 
 L’Article 25 de la Constitution belge de 1831 prévoit que tous les pouvoirs émanent 
de la Nation. Pourtant la Constitution reste silencieuse sur ce que recouvre le con-
cept de Nation. Curieusement, la question n’a guère soulevé de discussions dans le 
Congrès national. En conséquence, la déﬁ nition de la souveraineté nationale proc-
lamée dans la Constitution de 1831 reste indécise. Paradoxalement, les manuels de 
droit constitutionnel contemporains l’interprètent comme l’antithèse de la souver-
aineté du peuple. Ils s’inspirent pour cela d’une longue tradition intellectuelle, qui 
relie ces deux concepts à autant de courants mutuellement excluant en théorie poli-
tique. Abstraite et transhistorique, l’idée de ‘nation’ de l’abbé Sieyès aurait été 
délibérément préférée à celle du ‘peuple’, conçue comme réelle et historique, pro-
posée par Rousseau. Alors que cette dernière notion aurait été presque 
271  Magits ,  De Volksraad, 1977. 
B. Deseure
149
automatiquement associée à la démocratie directe et au suffrage universel, la pre-
mière fournirait la justiﬁ cation théorique pour limiter la participation politique aux 
seules couches sociales supérieures. Ce dernier but a sans aucun doute été poursuivi 
par le Congrès national belge. Aucun des délégués n’a appelé à l’introduction du 
suffrage universel ou à n’importe quel autre élargissement signiﬁ catif de la partici-
pation politique. 
 Néanmoins, la dichotomie peuple/nation ne sufﬁ t pas à expliquer la formulation 
de l’article 25. D’autres auteurs soulignent qu’à la ﬁ n du XVIIIe et au début du 
XIXe siècle, ces deux termes n’avaient pas de signiﬁ cation précise dans la théorie 
politique. Il s’avère en outre que dans les débats du Congrès national, les deux 
termes étaient utilisés de façon interchangeable. Dans la discussion sur la souver-
aineté, les deux étaient considérés comme synonymes. Le Congrès lui-même n’a 
pas hésité à expliquer l’article 25 comme la proclamation de la souveraineté du 
peuple. Le Congrès et le Gouvernement Provisoire se référaient explicitement au 
mandat qu’ils tenaient du peuple. Dans le contexte de la Révolution belge, dirigée 
contre le gouvernement autocrate du roi Guillaume I, cela est à peine surprenant. La 
Constitution de 1831 peut en effet être lue comme l’antithèse du système de gouver-
nement précédent, basé sur le principe monarchique. Elle limitait expressément le 
pouvoir royal à une liste de domaines spéciﬁ ques. Tous les pouvoirs résiduels étaient 
désormais du ressort du parlement. Dans la pratique, le régime parlementaire a failli 
se réaliser pendant les premières décennies après la promulgation de la Constitution. 
Néanmoins, l’origine de la souveraineté avait incontestablement changé de place. 
Désormais le pouvoir émanait d’en bas au lieu d’en haut. Le vocabulaire utilisé dans 
les débats du Congrès le conﬁ rme d’ailleurs: ‘nation’ et ‘roi’ y étaient traités comme 
des unités conceptuellement séparées, voire opposées l’une à l’autre. En ce sens, 
l’article 25 proclame bel et bien la souveraineté populaire. Les membres du Congrès 
ne voyaient pas de contradiction entre ce principe et la restriction de la participation 
politique à l’élite socio-économique par l’introduction simultanée du suffrage 
censitaire. 
 Les débats menés dans les journaux conﬁ rment cette analyse. Aucun des jour-
naux analysés ne contestait l’idée que l’article 25 impliquait la souveraineté du 
peuple. Vu les évènements révolutionnaires précédents, ils considéraient ce principe 
comme une évidence. Néanmoins, sa pertinence était vivement débattue par cette 
même presse. Le journal liégeois le Courrier de la Meuse, d’opinion catholique et 
réactionnaire, rejetait la souveraineté populaire, qu’il considérait comme un prin-
cipe dangereux et impossible à réaliser. Selon lui, il allait également à l’encontre de 
la souveraineté divine. De son côté, la presse radicale et démocratique était critique. 
La façon dont le principe proclamé par l’article 25 était converti en un règlement 
électoral s’est heurtée à une vive résistance de leur part. Alors que les journaux 
libéraux et catholiques modérés soutenaient l’introduction du suffrage censitaire, la 
presse radicale la considérait comme une violation injustiﬁ able de la souveraineté 
du peuple. Cette critique les a poussés à remettre en cause la légitimité du mandat 
du Congrès national et du Gouvernement Provisoire. Les vues radicales n’étant 
guère représentées dans le Congrès, ces idées ont trouvé peu d’écho cependant. 
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 En guise de conclusion on retient que, malgré le ﬂ ou entretenu autour du concept 
de souveraineté nationale dans la Constitution belge de 1831, les auteurs de cette 
dernière avaient à l’esprit un système politique assez bien déﬁ ni. Souveraineté 
nationale et souveraineté populaire étant pour eux synonymes, les deux concepts ne 
pouvaient pas, dans ce cas-ci, être considérés comme contraires. Ce sont des inter-
prétations ultérieures qui les ont investis d’un sens qu’ils n’avaient décidemment 
pas à l’époque. Cependant, s’il est sûr que la constituante a placé la source de la 
souveraineté dans le peuple, il est également certain qu’elle n’a pas voulu lui conﬁ er 
l’exercice du pouvoir. Les membres du Congrès, convoqués à la hâte et pressés par 
les évènements, étaient moins attentifs à des débats abstraits sur la signiﬁ cation des 
concepts politico-théoriques, qu’à l’établissement du pouvoir d’Etat dans les mains 
de l’élite socio-économique (pour autant qu’elle était hostile au régime 
hollandais). 
6.2  Nationale soevereiniteit in de Belgische Grondwet van 
1831. Over de betekenis(sen) van artikel 25 
 Artikel 25 van de Belgische Grondwet van 1831 bepaalt dat alle machten uitgaan 
van de Natie. Over wie of wat de Natie precies is, zwijgt de Grondwet echter. 
Opvallend genoeg werd er in het Belgisch Nationaal Congres ook nauwelijks debat 
gevoerd over de kwestie, waardoor de precieze betekenis van de geproclameerde 
nationale soevereiniteit allesbehalve eenduidig is. Hedendaagse handboeken grond-
wettelijk recht interpreteren haar onomwonden als tegenpool van de volkssoevere-
initeit, waarbij ze zich laten inspireren door een invloedrijke traditie die beide 
concepten terugleidt tot twee elkaar uitsluitende politiek-theoretische stromingen. 
Sieyès’ abstracte, transhistorische natieconcept zou doelbewust de voorkeur hebben 
gekregen boven Rousseau’s concrete en historische opvatting van het volk. Terwijl 
het laatste concept automatisch associaties met directe democratie en universeel 
stemrecht zou hebben opgeroepen, zou het eerste een vrijgeleide zijn geweest voor 
de beperking van de politieke participatie tot de maatschappelijke toplaag. Dit laat-
ste doel werd ongetwijfeld nagestreefd door het Belgisch Nationaal Congres. Geen 
enkele afgevaardigde deed een oproep tot de invoering van het algemeen stemrecht 
of tot een andere aanzienlijke verruiming van de politieke participatie. 
 Toch voldoet de tweedeling natie/volk niet om de formulering van artikel 25 te 
verklaren. Eerdere auteurs wezen er al op dat de precieze betekenis van deze termen 
in de politieke theorie aan het einde van de achttiende en het begin van de negent-
iende eeuw nog niet vastlag. Ook in de debatten van het Nationaal Congres bleken 
ze in grote mate inwisselbaar: wanneer ze voorkwamen in combinatie met soever-
einiteit, deden beide termen dienst als synoniem. Meer nog, de politieke leiders van 
het moment aarzelden niet om artikel 25 uit te leggen als de proclamatie van de 
volkssoevereiniteit. De Congresleden en het Voorlopig Bewind beriepen zich uit-
drukkelijk op hun door het volk verleende mandaat. In de context van de Belgische 
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Revolutie, die gericht was tegen het als autocratisch ervaren bewind van koning 
Willem I, verbaast dit nauwelijks. De Grondwet van 1831 kan gelezen worden als 
de antithese van Willems op het monarchale principe gestoelde regeersysteem. De 
koninklijke macht werd uitdrukkelijk beperkt tot de door de Grondwet vastgelegde 
domeinen. Alle residuele bevoegdheden waren voortaan het terrein van de volks-
vertegenwoordiging. Hoewel het zwaartepunt van de macht in de eerste decennia na 
de afkondiging van de Grondwet in de praktijk nog niet verschoof naar het par-
lement, kwam de soevereiniteit volgens deze regeling voortaan ondubbelzinnig van 
onderuit. Het woordgebruik van de Congresleden bevestigt dit: ‘natie’ en ‘vorst’ 
werden als conceptueel gescheiden en zelfs aan elkaar tegengestelde eenheden 
behandeld. In die zin proclameerde het Congres met artikel 25 dus inderdaad de 
volkssoevereiniteit. De gelijktijdige beperking van de politieke participatie tot de 
elite via het cijnskiesrecht werd door de betrokkenen meestal niet als een contradic-
tie ervaren. 
 Dit blijkt ook uit een analyse van de krantendebatten. Alle onderzochte kranten 
interpreteerden artikel 25 uitdrukkelijk als de proclamatie van de volkssoevereinit-
eit die ze, gezien de revolutionaire gebeurtenissen, als vanzelfsprekend beschou-
wden. Toch was het principe de inzet van verhitte debatten. Een reactionair katholiek 
blad zoals de Luikse  Courrier de le Meuse verwierp de volkssoevereiniteit omdat 
het haar beschouwde als een gevaarlijk en niet te realiseren principe, dat bovendien 
inging tegen de goddelijke soevereiniteit. Vooral in de radicale, democratisch gez-
inde pers klonk de kritiek echter hard. De manier waarop het in artikel 25 geprocla-
meerde principe werd omgezet naar een kiesreglement, stootte bij hen op grote 
weerstand. Terwijl de gematigde katholieke en liberale bladen het Congres steunden 
bij de invoering van het cijnskiesrecht, beschouwde de radicale pers deze als een 
onrechtmatige aantasting van de volkssoevereiniteit. Deze kritiek leidde hen er zelfs 
toe om de legitimiteit van het mandaat van het Nationaal Congres en het Voorlopig 
Bewind in vraag te stellen. Aangezien de radicale standpunten nauwelijks in het 
Congres waren vertegenwoordigd, vonden ze echter weinig weerklank. 
 Als conclusie kan gelden dat, hoewel de nationale soevereiniteit in de Belgische 
Grondwet van 1831 geen eenduidige politiek-theoretische betekenis had, de opstell-
ers ervan wél een duidelijk politiek systeem voor ogen stond. Aangezien nationale 
soevereiniteit en volkssoevereiniteit voor de betrokkenen synoniem waren, kunnen 
beide concepten in dit geval niet worden beschouwd als elkaars tegendeel. Latere 
interpretaties hebben er een invulling aan gegeven die ze op het moment zelf nog 
niet hadden. Zeker is echter dat, hoewel de oorsprong van de soevereiniteit door de 
grondwetgever overduidelijk in het volk werd gevestigd, er geen sprake van was om 
haar ook door het volk te laten uitoefenen. De inderhaast bijeengeroepen 
Congresleden hadden minder aandacht voor abstracte politiek-theoretische debatten 
dan voor het vestigen van de staatsmacht in handen van (het antihollands gezinde 
deel van) de sociaal-economische elite. 
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